NOTE: I have added at the bottom of this post the text of two letters I requested from Professor Feith from his lawyer to the DOD’s IG on the subject of “inappropriate” behavior on the part of Feith and his staff, as well as the text of the current Undersecretary of Defense Erik Edelman’s response to the IG Report.
This is a long post, as I am going to try and collect in one place the key documents and links a reader will need to understand that the another in the many attempts to rewrite history to serve an antiwar political agenda.
The key question: In the late '90s and early years of this decade, did the CIA do a good job in predicting 9/11 or assessing Saddam's WMD? Those two numbers and three letters provide the context for the sham "controversy" surrounding former Undersecretary Douglas Feith. Did the CIA see 9/11 coming? Did the agency produce any reports asserting boldly that Saddam did not have the WMD that everyone thought he did?
Was the CIA, in 2002, an agency to be trusted to get the big ones right?
Of course not. The professionals of the agency tried, but they failed. After 9/11 the professionals at the DoD decided to look hard at the intelligence product coming out of the CIA concerning al Qaeda and Saddam. Now partisans are attempting to argue that DoD shouldn't do such a thing --a conclusion that would be hilarious if it wasn't so dangerous.
In an example of how the Administration and its past members ought to be conducting the war against the war against the war, former Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith has an op-ed in today's Washington Post that eviscerates Carl Levin and the media coverage of the report by the Pentagon's Inspector General which caused a flurry of misleading headlines last week. The Wall Street Journal has already rightly characterized Levin as having gone Ahab over Feith, but this isn't a tale of one senator's scurrilous behavior. It is a much larger drama that goes to how badly broken our intelligence gathering was and probably remains.
After our interview yesterday, (transcript here and key excerpts here) I began to assemble the relevant documents which fully support the assertion that Feith's office had been fully exonerated, and that Levin's grandstanding was itself cherry-picking of a report he had demanded but which had not only not convicted Feith and staff of illegal, unauthorized or misleading conduct, but which opens the door again to the central problem of the CIA Bill Clinton left behind --a thoroughly politicized and broken organization that has spent the past six years attempting to divert attention from the massive intelligence failure that led to 9/11 and the second intelligence failure that assumed large quantities of WMD in Iraq prior to the invasion. Those documents include Feith's statement from Friday, the transcript of the Senate hearing from that day, and also the report of the Republican Policy Committee, chaired by Arizona's Jon Kyl, which concluded:
The allegations of unlawful, improper and inappropriate activities by the Office of theUnder Secretary of Defense for Policy with regard to Iraq pre-war intelligence reflect misunderstandings about the facts and impractical ideas about how the U.S. government works. These allegations have been looked at and dismissed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It is irresponsible for critics of the administration in the U.S. Senate and elsewhere to continue to put these allegations forward when they know, or should know, that there is no evidence to support them.
Here is a key excerpt from the hearing, a summary statement by Senator Inhofe:
Inhofe: First of all, you can read the same report and come up with different conclusions, which is quite obvious and will be obvious. And I think that we, of course, want to hear from Mr. Gimble on the report so we can come to our own conclusions.
I don't think in any way that his report could be interpreted as a devastating condemnation, as you point out, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I've talked to the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Pat Roberts, on numerous occasions about this. And they've gone over it and over it and over it; had the Intelligence Committee, which is bipartisan; the bipartisan WMD committee -- Silberman and our former colleague Chuck Robb -- separately examine these matters in detail. Each concluded unanimously that no intelligence analysts were pressured.
The Intelligence Committee also found that there was no basis for any allegations that have been made against the undersecretary. Roberts wrote to the Department of Defense inspector general -- now, he was the first one to make this request, and he did so for this reason -- this is his quote now: "The committee is concerned about persistent and, to date, unsubstantiated allegations that there was something unlawful or improper about the activities of the Office of Special Plans with the Office of the Undersecretary. I have not discovered any credible evidence or unlawful or improper activity. And yet the allegations persist."
In attempt to stop these allegations once and for all, he had made the request to the inspector general's office.
I would have to say, also, Mr. Chairman, that these matters have been scrutinized at least three times in the last three years by bipartisan, nonpartisan groups. The Intelligence Committee unanimously reported that it found that this process, the policy- makers' probing questions, actually improved the CIA's process. In other words, what they were doing in getting into this thing and bringing these issues up caused the intelligence community to go back and relook and to reexamine and to do a better job than they were going to do otherwise.
Some intelligence analysts even told the committee that policy- makers' questions had -- and I'm quoting now -- "questions had forced them to go back and review the intelligence reporting," and that during this exercise they came across information that they had overlooked in the initial readings. In other words, they actually provided a service by bringing these things up.
As I mentioned to you, Mr. Chairman, I'll be leaving in 20 minutes to catch a plane, so I won't be bothering you too long here.
Thank you very much.
And here is Feith's statement from Friday:
It is good but not surprising that the Inspector General (“IG”) found that the Pentagon Policy office’s activities were all legal and authorized and that Policy officials did not mislead Congress.
The Policy office has been smeared for years by allegations that its pre-Iraq-War work was somehow “unlawful” or “unauthorized” and that some information it gave to congressional committees was deceptive or misleading. The office’s accusers always couched the charges in vague language, making them difficult to refute with precision. The charges have been repeated persistently despite the lack of any substantiation. The IG report has now thoroughly repudiated the smears.
In faulting Pentagon policy officials for “inappropriately” criticizing the CIA’s pre-Iraq-war intelligence, however, the IG report takes an absurd position. The report says that written criticism of the CIA’s work is an “intelligence activity” inappropriate for policy officials. But professional criticism of intelligence by policy officials is a good thing. The Pentagon briefing at the heart of this matter was a good thing and our government is better off when policy officials challenge speculative intelligence. Both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission said we need more, not less, criticism of intelligence work by policy officials.
The Silberman-Robb WMD Commission said:
While policymakers must be prepared to credit intelligence that doesn’t fit their preferences, no important intelligence assessment should be accepted without sharp questioning that forces the community to explain exactly how it came to that assessment and what alternatives might also be true. This is not “politicization;” it is a necessary part of the intelligence process. [March 31, 2005 Transmittal Letter]
The Pentagon critics of the CIA created a briefing specifically for the purpose of criticizing poor intelligence work. The IG report attacks the briefing’s quality not on the basis of an examination of the underlying intelligence but because the briefing varied from the consensus of the intelligence community. It, of course, varied from that consensus – it was a criticism of that consensus. That is why it was written. It makes no sense to say it was unreliable for that reason.
The briefing activity was the very same work that the Senate Intelligence Committee praised in its July 2004 report, which was endorsed by all the Democrats as well as all the Republicans on the committee. That report concluded that the Policy officials involved acted professionally, “played by [intelligence community] rules” and asked questions that “actually improved the [CIA’s] products.”
It is bizarre for the Inspector General to disapprove of policy officials’ doing work that they were directed to do by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, given that those tasks were lawful and authorized and the Inspector General found nothing at all wrong with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary directing that the work be done.
If the Inspector General’s opinions about appropriate criticism were followed, they would discourage policy officials from asking tough questions about the quality of CIA work. Pentagon policy officials asked good, honest, critical questions, challenging the CIA, whose work (as everyone now knows) was by no means flawless and above challenge. That the CIA did not agree with the criticism from the Pentagon does not mean that the criticism was unreliable or inappropriate and it is illogical for the IG to say it does.
Clearly, the Inspector General’s office was willing to challenge the Policy office and even stretch some points to be able to criticize it. So it is all the more impressive that the Inspector General’s report so thoroughly and categorically rejects the persistent smears of the Policy office regarding unlawful or deceptive activity.
More to follow as I find it, but anyone who thinks the DoD was wrong to look long and hard at CIA conclusions or that it was inappropriate for the DoD to analyze the CIA's findings isn't serious about the national security.
UPDATE:
I requested and received two letters which Douglas Feith's lawyer provided the DoD IG on the absurd finding of "inappropriate" behavior. As anyone who has ever worked with an IG realizes, this is an accordian term with no legal standard attached to it, and thus the worst sort of judgment an IG can render --a necessarily political one.
Letter #1: Dated: August 2, 2006, Patton Boggs letterhead:
Office of the Inspector General, Department of DefenseATTN: Lieutenant Colonel Charles E . Edge
Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
400 Army Navy Drive, Room 703
Arlington, VA 22202-4704
Re: Follow-up to Interview of The Honorable Douglas J. Feith
Dear Colonel Edge:
During the interview of Mr. Feith on July 20,2006, you asked about a meeting he had in
his home with a then-civilian employee of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (OUSDP) in 2004. Mr. Feith recounted his recollection of the meeting for you and your
colleagues and stated that Mr. Michael Mobbs, another OUSDP civilian employee, was the third
person present at the meeting. Mr. Mobbs, who still works at OUSDP, drafted a memorandum
of the conversation at that 2004 meeting. Mr. Feith approved and initialed the memo on May 13,
2004, and sent it to the Principal Deputy General Counsel, Mr. Dan Dell'Orto. After you
requested a copy at our July 20 interview, Mr. Dell'Orto provided us one. We enclose a copy foryour review.
This memorandum of conversation was prepared long before the DODIG began its
review of the OUSDP. It reflects Mr. Feith's attitude about the role of the policy makers versus
the role of intelligence officials while he was serving as Under Secretary. The memorandum is ayour review.
The memorandum of conversation was prepared long before the DODIG began its
review of the OUSDP. It reflects Mr. Feith's attitude about the role of the policy makers versus
the role of intelligence officials while he was serving as Under Secretary. The memorandum is a
record of Mr. Feith's decisive action to avoid even any perception that his policy staff was
engaging in activity that should be done only by the intelligence community. His orders to the
employee were emphatic and unequivocal - no policy employee was to do anything, "no matter
how well-intentioned" that could be interpreted (or that might be expected to be misinterpreted)
as intelligence activity.
The memorandum highlights a central issue in your review, that is, the distinction
between policymaking and intelligence activity. It shows that Mr. Feith was concerned about the
distinction and wanted to ensure that his subordinates respected it.
You informed us that, at this point in your review, you have found no instances of illegal
or unauthorized activity. You said the open question was whether any activity had been
inappropriate. You commented on the absence of a relevant, defined standard for "appropriate"
activity. We suggest you consider the following as a standard for deciding whether an activity you
are reviewing was appropriate.
Where there has been no activity violating the laws, regulations or DoD directives that
define and authorize the work of the OUSDP, then appropriateness should turn on whether the
activity in question was transparent or known to Mr. Feith's immediate superiors in the chain of
command and maybe also to his counterparts in the interagency national security decision-making
apparatus.
By "transparent" we mean visible to and understood by Mr. Feith's superiors. Even if an
activity is legal and authorized, a superior in the chain of command clearly has broad discretion to
limit or terminate it as inappropriate, if that superior so chooses. If a properly informed superior,
regarding an otherwise lawful and authorized activity, declines to limit or terminate it, the activity
has to be deemed appropriate.
When this "lawful - authorized - transparent" standard is applied to the activity you are
reviewing, we believe the conclusion will be that the activity was appropriate. Consider, for
example, the so-called Shelton briefing. After the briefing was given to Mr. Feith, he directed
that it be given to the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary then
directed that it be given to the Director of Central Intelligence who received it with a number of
senior staff present. The briefing was then openly discussed in a Deputies Committee meeting,
including by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. That discussion led to Stephen
Hadley's request, as Deputy National Security Advisor, to receive the briefing. Throughout the
whole process, the existence of the briefing and its contents were transparent to Mr. Feith's chain
of command and to key interagency colleagues. Neither Mr. Feith's superiors in the Department
of Defense nor those interagency colleagues expressed the view that it was inappropriate. Under
such circumstances, we believe the only reasonable conclusion is that the activity was appropriate.
It was lawful, authorized and transparent.
If you would like to discuss any of these issues further or we can be of further assistance,
please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.
Major General, US Army, Retired
Letter #2: Dated September 28, 2006, Patton Boggs letterhead:
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense
A'TTN: Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Edge
Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intehgence
400 Army Navy Drive, Room 703
Arlington, VA 22202-4704
Re: The Honorable Douglas J. Feith
Dear Colonel Edge:
Thank you very much for taking the time to talk on Tuesday. As always, we appreciate your
candor and your willingness to keep us apprised, to the extent that you are able, of the status of
the review concerning Mr. Feith and his former office.
We also appreciate knowing that with your interviews now completed you have found no
instances of illegal or unauthorized activity. Because the third issue raised in Senator Roberts'
letter - whether any activity was "inappropriate" - remains a challenge due to the lack of a defined
standard, we offer additional thoughts for your consideration. These thoughts supplement our
August 2,2006 letter to you.
We said previously that where there was no activity violating the laws, regulations, or DoD
directives that define and authorize the work of the OUSDP, the appropriateness should turn on
whether the activity in question was tmsparent or known to Mr. Feith's immediate superiors in
the chain of command and perhaps also to his counterparts in the interagency national security
decision-making apparatus. We also said that, if a properly informed superior in the chain of
command allows a lawful and authorized activity to go forward, that activity has to be deemed
appropriate. The superior, after all, could limit or terminate it as inappropriate. Applying this
"lawful - authorized - transparent" standard to the activity you are reviewing then, we believe the
activity was clearly appropriate.
In highlighting the "transparency" element, we are not suggesting that the superior's visibility
over the activities - by itself - determines the issue. Also critically important is the superior's
authority and responsibility to act if faced with inappropriate activity. The superior could act.
There should be a presumption that the superior would act if the activity were inappropriate.
Moreover, in the particular circumstances of this case, we believe it is important to point out that
Mr. Feith's superiors did not merely have visibility of the activities in which his staff was
engaging. His superiors were engaged in those activities. Mr. Feith properly notified them of his
staff's work and arranged a briefing of the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary of Defense. Once
that took place, the Secretary directed the briefing be given to the QA Director, and it was
through the Deputy Secretary's intervention that the briefing eventually was given to the NSC
Deputy. Mr. Feith was acting as a member of a team here, not as an independent figure. The
Secretary and Deputy Secretary had ample discretion to act as they did, and in doing so they
reflected the belief that their activity and Mr. Feith's were appropriate.
We would be happy to discuss these thoughts in more detail with you and your team or the IG
General Counsel, whenever convenient. Please let us know what we may do to help.
Sincerely,
Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired
UPDATE: Here is the response ot the IG Report from the current Undersecretary of Defense Edelman's office. It is 53 pages long, but useful in its damning detail:
COMMENTS BY THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON ADRAFT OF A PROPOSED REPORT BY THE DOD OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
PROJECT NO. D2006DINTOl-0077.000
REVIEW OF PRE-IRAQI WAR ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OFTHE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (U)
January 16,2007
OUSD(P) COMMENTS ON DRAFT OF A PROPOSED REPORT BY THE DOD OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALREVIEW OF PRE-IRAQI WAR ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (U) PROJECT NO. D2006DINT01-0077.000
January 16,2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. SUMMARY OF KEY ERRORS IN THE DRAFT REPORT (U) ................................. 4
11. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THIS MATTER (U) .................................... 7
111. OUSD(P) SUPPORT TO THE OIG REVIEW (U) ................................................... 11
IV. FACTS (U) ................................................................................................................. 11
A. THREE SEPARATE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE WORK UNDER REVIEW (U) . . . . . . . . 12
1. The PCTEG (U) ................................................................................................... 13
2. The DIA Analyst Detailed to the Policy Support Office (U) ............................ ..... 16
3. The Deputy Secretary's Tasking to Brief the Secretary of Defense (U) ............... 18
B. DRAFT BRIEFING TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (U) ........................................... 22
C. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S DIRECTION TO BRIEF DCI, DRAFT BRIEFING TO DCI,
CIA MEETING (U) .......................................................................................................... 25
D. DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S REQUEST, DSD's DIRECTION, DRAFT
BRIEFING TO DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR (U) ........................................ 27
E. DCI ' s CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS ON IRAQ AND AL-QAID A (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8
V. DISCUSSION (U) ....................................................................................................... 3 1
A. WHY ARE LAWFUL AND AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES NEVERTHELESS CALLED
"INAPPROPRIATE"? (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1
B. DIA'S DI POLICY NOS. 004 AND 005 DO NOT APPLY TO IVON-IC OFFICES DIRECTED
BY SENIOR DoD LEADERS TO CRITIQUE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORK (U) . . . . . . . . 3 3
1. The Internal DIA Policies Do Not Apply to DIA Members While Detailed to
Policy Positions Outside DIA 's Chain of Command (U) ........................................ 34
2. The Internal DIA Policies Contain No Procedure for an IC Customer to Obtain
an Alternative IC Judgment, Which in any Case is not What the DSD Sought Here
(U) . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3. The Internal DIA Policies Were Not Coordinated or Published as Would Have
Been Required ifIntended to Apply Outside DIA (U) ............................................... 35
C. "INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES" CONSTITUTE A PROCESS USING ALL KEY ELEMENTS
OF INTELLIGENCE WORK BY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES (U). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
D . ALTERNATIVE OR CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF IC INFORMATION AND IC JUDGMENTS
BY NON-IC OFFICES ARE NOT "INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES" (U) ................................. 37
E . OUSD(P) DID NOT PRODUCE OR DISSEMINATE "INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS" OR
"INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS" (U) .................................................................................... 38
F . THE RELEVANT ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES DESCRIBE INTELLIGENCE ROLES AND
ACTIVITIES. THEY DO NOT PROSCRIBE POLICY ACTIVITIES (U) ................................... 40
VI . OUSD(P) NONCONCURRENCE (U) ...................................................................... 43
..................................................... . A WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE DRAFT REPORT (U) 43
................................... . B WITH THE COMMENDATIONS OF THE DRAFT REPORT (U) 44
................................................................................................... . VII CONCLUSION (U) 45
. ........................................................... APPEIVDIX A: DI POLICY NOS 004 AND 005 47
APPENDIX B: COMMENTS ON OIG'S ANSWERS TO SENATOR LEVIN ............ 50
OUSD(P) COMMENTS ON
DRAFT OF A PROPOSED REPORT
BY THE DOD OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
REVIEW OF PRE-IRAQI WAR ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (U)
PROJECT NO. D2006DINT01-0077.000
January 16,2007
The Committee believes that IC analysts should expect difficult and repeated questions regarding
threat information. . . .The Committee found that this process - the policymakers probing questions -
actually improved the [CIA 's]products. ... While analysts cannot dismiss a threat because at first
glance it seems unreasonable or it cannot be corroborated by other credible reporting, policymakers
have the ultimate responsibility for making decisions based on this same fragmentary, inconclusive
reporting.'
(U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) offers the
following comments on a December 20,2006 Draft of a Proposed Report (the "Draft
Report") by the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General ("OIG") in Project
No. D2006DINTO 1-0077.000, "Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (U)" (the "Project").
(U) Throughout these comments we observe that the work on which this Project
concentrates, and in particular the specific activities that the Draft Report characterizes as
"inappropriate," were authorized and directed to be done by the Deputy Secretary or the
Secretary of Defense. For the purpose of these comments, references to "work" or
"activities" "authorized" and "directed" by the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, "the most
senior leaders" of DoD, or "senior DoD leaders" specifically mean the following:
(U) The Deputy Secretary of Defense ("Deputy" or "DSD") directed his Special
Assistant in his front office and two staff members in OUSD(P) to take a fresh, critical
look at Intelligence Community ("IC") reporting on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida.
In working on the Deputy's tasking, one of the OUSD(P) staffers prepared an internal
memo containing two commentary paragraphs followed by a list summarizing IC reports
on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. The staffers wrote up the critique requested by
DSD in the form of a draft briefing that discussed IC reports on Iraq-al-Qaida contacts
and how these reported contacts might be viewed absent an a priori assumption that
secular Baathists and Islamic extremists would never cooperate. The Deputy Secretary
1 (U) Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the US. Intelligence Community's Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (U) (9 July 2004), pp. 34, 35 (unanimous report, unclassified version)
("SSCI Report").
directed that the draft briefing be given to the Secretary of Defense. After receiving it,
the Secretary directed that it be shared with the DCI. The Deputy Secretary's office also
d.irected that the draft briefing be given to the Deputy National Security Advisor when the
latter requested it.
I. SUMMARY OF KEY ERRORS IN THE DRAFT REPORT (U)
(U) The title of the Draft Report is inaccurate. The work on which the Draft Report
focuses was not "OUSD(P)"'activity. It was in fact a response to tasking by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, who in July 2002 directed his Special Assistant in his
front office and two staff members in OUSD(P) to critique IC reporting on contacts
between Iraq and al-Qaida. The result was a draft briefing on how those contacts
might be viewed if one did not assume a priori that secular Baathists and Islamic
extremists would never cooperate. The Deputy Secretary directed that the draft
briefing be given the Secretary of Defense. After receiving it, the Secretary directed
that it be shared with the DCI. When the Deputy National Security Advisor requested
the draft briefing, the Deputy Secretary's office directed that it be given to him.
(U) The work reviewed was not an "OUSD(P)" activity, assessment, view, position or
initiative, despite the Draft Report's repeated assertions to the contrary. The Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) never approved, adopted or advocated the
draft briefing or any of the work leading to it as an "OUSD(P)" view or assessment.
Each version of the briefing was marked "draft" or "draft working papers" and was
never presented as anything other than that.
(U) The Draft Report correctly finds that these activities were lawful and authorized.
It correctly states (page 34) that "the Secretary [of Defense] owns the DoD Directives
governing (among others) Intelligence and Policy, and as long as Executive Orders or
other legal statutes are not violated, he has the latitude to interchange roles and
responsibilities." But in contradiction of these same findings, the Draft Report
incorrectly calls the activities "inappropriate," because they supposedly amounted to
"dissemination" to senior decision-makers of "alternative intelligence assessments"
"inconsistent" with the "consensus" of the IC.
(U) If the OIG believes that it was inappropriate for the Deputy Secretary of Defense
to have non-IC OSD staff members critique IC work on a significant subject of
national security, inappropriate for the Secretary of Defense to share the OSD work
with the DCI, and inappropriate for the Deputy Secretary to share the work with the
Deputy National Security Advisor when requested by the latter, the OIG should say so
directly instead of finding fault with subordinate OSD offices and staff members who
did as the Secretary or Deputy Secretary instructed.
(U) The entire argument in the Draft Report rests on the definition of "Intelligence
Activities" and the meaning of "intelligence assessments." The Report's
interpretation of the definition of "Intelligence Activities" found in the relevant DoD
directive is wrong. By its definition, that term on its face applies only to intelligence
agencies, not to policy offices.
(U) Because OUSD(P) routinely and properly acquires, assesses and distributes
"information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers,"2
stretching the definition of "Intelligence Activities" to include policy offices would
lead to the absurd result of mischaracterizing most work done in OUSD(P) as
"Intelligence Activities."
(U) The Report does not define the term "intelligence assessments" but erroneously
asserts that a critique by non-IC staffers of IC assessments was itself an
"inappropriate" "intelligence assessment." There are no facts in the Draft Report, or
otherwise, supporting the assertion that this work was presented as "intelligence
assessments.''
(U) There are likewise no facts suggesting that the "senior decision-makers" who
were briefed on this work, specifically, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the DCI, the Deputy National Security Advisor, and the Vice
President's Chief of Staff, mistook this work to be "intelligence assessments."
(U) The Report fails to make clear that the Office of Special Plans (OSP), the Policy
Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), and the Policy Support Office did not
perform and had no responsibility for any of the work reviewed in this Project. This
failure is especially egregious in light of press reports and political criticism that
continue to assert the contrary.
(U) The Draft Report labels the work products at issue as "inappropriate" (page 4)
because they allegedly "did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the
Intelligence Community" and "were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products."
But the senior decision-makers briefed on this work (one of whom was the DCI
himself) did not need to be told that it varied in some respects from IC analysis; that
was inescapably obvious. There are no facts to suggest that any of them drew any
conclusions or made any decisions whatsoever solely on the basis of .the draft
briefing, without taking IC views into account. There are no facts supporting the
claim that some work products "were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products."
2 (U) Part of the definition of "foreign intelligence," which in turn is part of the definition of "Intelligence
Activities." See DoD Directive No. 5240.1, DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988, Sections 3.1
and 3.2.
(U) OUSD(P) did not impede or undercut any responsibilities of the Intelligence
Community, contrary to suggestions in the Draft Report. The IC was fully aware of
the work under review and commented on it several times, as the Draft Report itself
reveals. Further, the DCI was personally briefed on the work at the Secretary of
Defense's direction.
(U) OUSD(P) did not bypass any applicable DIA procedures, contrary to assertions in
the Draft Report. The DIA's DI Policy Nos. 004 and 005, cited by the Draft Report,
are internal DIA guidelines that only apply to DIA analysts, working as such, who
wish to produce alternative analyses or alternative judgments within DIA's chain of
command. These guidelines are irrelevant to customer offices of the IC - the
consumers of intelligence -- that wish to suggest an alternative way of viewing
information and analyses already provided by the IC. Nor do these guidelines provide
any mechanism for DIA customers to request an alternative judgment by the IC,
which in any case is manifestly not what the Deputy Secretary desired when he
directed the work under review to be done.
(U) While some of the work reviewed in this Project did characterize the Iraq-al-
Qaida relationship as "cooperative," that characterization did not contradict IC
judgments on the subject at the time. To the contrary, the reference in .the draft
briefing to a "cooperative" Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was consistent with the DCI's
own statements to Congress in 2002 and 2003. He said then that "we have solid
reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida going back a decade,"
"credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qaida have discussed safe haven and
reciprocal non-aggression," "we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-
Qaida members," "the reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qaida
members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs," etc.
The Draft Report ignores these DCI statements.
(U) The Draft Report erroneously faults OUSD(P) for failin to provide "the most f accurate analysis of intelligence" to senior decision-makers. That responsibility rests
with the IC, not OUSD(P). More importantly, senior decision-makers already had the
IC's reports and assessments on Iraq and al-Qaida and thus already had "the most
accurate analysis of intelligence" -- if one accepts, as the Draft Report seems to do,
that .the IC's assessments are the "most acc~rate."~
3 (U) This criticism is symptomatic of the peculiar and sometimes contradictory logic of the Draft Report,
for the Draft Report also holds that OUSD(P) should not provide any intelligence analyses at all.
4 (U) The Draft Report purports to make judgments about the nature of the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship, but
these judgments appear to be based on certain CIA and DIA analytical papers -- not on any
contemporaneous NIE or other authoritative consensus by the IC as a whole -- and without reference to
the DCI's own statements on the subject. There is no evidence in the Draft Report that the OIG
(U) The Draft Report recommends (page 14) that, if OUSD(P) disagrees with an IC
consensus, OUSD(P) should "clearly articulate in policy products the Intelligence
Community consensus and the basis for disagreement or variance from the
Intelligence Community consensus." Such a requirement would inappropriately
constrain policy work by requiring policy offices to vet every policy recommendation
or analysis with the IC in order to determine whether or not it disagreed or varied with
an IC "consensus." It would also burden policy offices with a requirement to
articulate the IC "consensus" when the IC itself should do so.
(U) Bipartisan reports and studies by various commissions and congressional
committees since the 911 1 attacks have stressed the need for vigorous debate, hard
questions and alternative thinking of the sort that motivated the work reviewed in this
Project. The conclusions and recommendation in the Draft Report reflect a disturbing
departure from the lessons of all these reports and studies. By faulting a critical
assessment in OSD of IC work on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida, the Draft
Report would inhibit the vigorous debate and hard questioning that most observers
recognize as essential. The Draft Report's conclusions, if sustained, would have a
dampening effect on future initiatives challenging intelligence assessments. The facts
do not justify such conclusions.
11. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THIS MATTER (U)
(U) The activities reviewed in this Project, unfortunately, have been the object of
bitter political debate and inaccurate press reporting for over three years. Given the
partisan nature of the matter, it was particularly important that the OIG's independent
review adhere to the strictest standards of factual accuracy, rigorous analysis, and clarity
of expression. Unfortunately, the Draft Report does not meet those standards.
(U) Apart from numerous factual inaccuracies, omissions and mischaracterizations
identified throughout these comments, the Draft Report suffers from a basic analytical
flaw in attempting to paint the work under review as "inappropriate" even though no laws
were broken, no DoD directives were violated, and no applicable policies were
disregarded. The Draft Report concedes that the activities reviewed were lawful. It
concedes that the activities were authorized - indeed requested - by the Deputy Secretary
and Secretary of Defense. In perhaps its most trenchant observation, the Draft Report
correctly states (page 34) that "the Secretary owns the DoD Directives governing (among
others) Intelligence and Policy, and as long as Executive Orders or other legal statutes
are not violated, he has the latitude to interchange roles and responsibilities" (emphasis
added).
undertook any rigorous, independent review of the underlying intelligence on the issue of contacts
between Iraq and al-Qaida.
(U) That observation goes to the heart of the present matter. It shows that the
activities in question were clearly appropriate. No statutes or executive orders were
violated. The Secretary, and by extension the Deputy, unequivocally had the latitude to
obtain an alternative, critical assessment of IC work on Iraq and al-Qaida from non-IC
OSD staff members rather than from the DIA or the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
C31, without vetting such critique through any Intelligence Community process. The
Secretary had the latitude to direct the authors of such critique to share it with the DCI.
The Deputy Secretary had the latitude to direct the authors of such critique to share it
with the Vice President's Chief of Staff and the Deputy National Security Advisor when
the latter so requested. This should have put an end to any question of appropriateness.
(U) The OIG is empowered and competent to determine whether the activities
were lawful and authorized. But we question whether it is "appropriate" for the OIG to
venture into the realm of opinion about whether the activities were appropriate, in the
absence of any applicable standards, regulations, directives, etc. This is especially true
where, as here, the OIG has found the activities in question were lawful and authorized,
and has conceded that the Secretary and Deputy have the "latitude to interchange roles
and responsibilities" in overseeing DoD.
(U) We respectfully observe that the OIG's opinion on the subjective question of
"appropriateness" in these circumstances is not entitled to any particular deference. The
OIG does not have special expertise on this issue, which is fraught with policy and
political dimensions. Given the politically charged atmosphere infecting this entire
matter, it is especially objectionable for the OIG to obscure and minimize the fact that the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary directed the activities in question be done, to
mischaracterize the work as "OUSD(P)" activities, and to find something "inappropriate"
in the fact that subordinate offices and staffers did as the Secretary and Deputy directed.
(U) Moreover, the Draft Report employs a demonstrably incorrect reading of
"Intelligence Activities" to portray the work reviewed as "alternative intelligence
assessments," "Intelligence Production" and the like, when in fact it was not. This
mischaracterization is particularly egregious in light of the persistently false press reports
and political accusations claiming that the Deputy Secretary, or OUSD(P), or others in
the Defense Department distorted intelligence in order to argue that Iraq had a direct role
in the 911 1 attacks, or that Iraq and al-Qaida had a stronger relationship than shown by
facts known at the time, in order to propel the United States to war on false pretenses.
(U) Before the OIG ever took up this matter, it had been the subject of an
exhaustive investigation that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) began
in July 2003, as well as a "minority inquiry" begun by Senator Carl Levin in June 2003.
(U) In July 2004, the Committee issued a unanimous report on "Phase I" of its
investigation. That report concluded inter alia that policymakers at no time pressured the
IC to change its conclusions on Iraq's links to terrorism, and that the work of OSD
staffers reviewed here did not result in any changes to the analytical judgments in IC
work on Iraqi support for terrorism.' The Committee deferred to a second phase of its
investigation an evaluation of whether the work products now under OIG review were
"objective, reasonable, and acc~rate."~ Because of divisions along partisan lines within
the SSCI, its members have not to date been able to agree on what conclusions to reach in
its "Phase 11" report.
(U) SSCI Chairman Pat Roberts referred this matter to OIG only because these
partisan divisions prevented the SSCI from reaching agreement on what to say about the
activities reviewed in this Project. By the time he made the referral to OIG, the issue had
been transformed from whether the work in question was "objective, reasonable and
accurate" to whether it was "unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate" -- even though the
SSCI had uncovered no information to support such a characterization.
(U) In his September 9, 2005 letter requesting an independent review by OIG,
Chairman Roberts wrote that "the Committee is concerned about persistent and, to date,
unsubstantiated allegations that there was something unlawful or improper about the
activities of the Office of Special Plans within the office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy during the period prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom."
He added that he had "not discovered any credible evidence of unlawful or improper
activity, yet the allegations persist." He nevertheless asked the OIG to review "whether
the personnel assigned to the Office of Special Plans, at any time, conducted
unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence activities."
(U) On September 22,2005, Senator Carl Levin wrote in his capacity as Ranking
Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), asking the OIG to expand the
scope of the review requested by Chairman Roberts. Specifically, Senator Levin
requested that "you include all elements of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, including the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the
Policy Support office." He posed a number of questions for the 01G to an~wer.~
(U) In fact Senator Levin had already published his own conclusions on this
matter nearly a year before the OIG took up its review. See "Report of an Inquiry Into
the Alternative Analysis of the Issue of an Iraq-a1 Qaeda Relationship" (October 2 1,
2004), containing numerous incorrect allegations of improper conduct within OUSD(P).
(U) SSCI Report, p. 363.
(U) SSCI Report, p. 3 12.
7 (U) At Appendix B attached to these comments, we address in detail the Draft Report's answers to
Senator Levin's questions.
That report was part of the "minority inquiry" that Senator Levin has been pursuing into
the subject matter of this Project since June 2003, without the endorsement of the SASC,
the SSCI, or any other congressional committee as of early January 2007. The Draft
Report (page 1) comments that Senator Levin's report "challenged some of the
conclusions" in the SSCI's report of July 2004 but fails to note that Senator Levin
himself, as a SSCI member, concurred in that same SSCI report and that the SSCI report
was unanimous.
(U) It bears emphasis that the same set of facts and documents have been available
to the SSCI and to Senator Levin throughout this process.
(U) More recently, on December 8,2006, Representative Cynthia McKinney
introduced articles of impeachment against the President of the United States, the first
article of which makes the false assertion that the President and the Secretary of Defense
created the OSP "to override existing intelligence reports by providing unreliable
evidence that supported the claim that Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction posed
an imminent threat to the United States of ~merica."'
(U) Meanwhile, uninformed and inaccurate press reports have persisted, generally
on the theme that the Office of Special Plans allegedly conducted a rogue intelligence
operation before the Iraq war and fed incorrect or exaggerated intelligence information to
senior policy makers in the Executive Branch, bypassing the Intelligence Community and
contributing to an ill-informed decision to go to war in Iraq. These stories have been
repeated so many times that they are now taken as established truth by some members of
Congress and many commentators.
(U) Indeed, even the Draft Report to some extent seems to fall prey to the hypnotic
effect of these constantly repeated falsehoods. Instead of setting the record straight
clearly and directly, the Draft Report relegates to a footnote (at page ii, repeated at page
1) the peculiar comment that:
"The term Office of Special Plans has become generic terminology for the
activities of the OUSD(P), including the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation
Group and Policy Support Office. The actual Office of Special Plans had no
responsibility for and did not perform any of the activities examined in this
review."
(U) As the facts detailed below demonstrate, neither the OSP, the PCTEG, nor the
Policy Support Office had any responsibility for the activities reviewed, and none of
these units as such performed any of those activities. The Draft Report should say so
forthrightly.
8 (U) H. Res. 1106, 109'~ Cong., 2"* Sess. (8 December 2006).
(U) The Draft Report should also say prominently and forthrightly that the most
senior leaders of DoD d.irected these activities to be done by non-IC OSD staff members,
not all of whom were even assigned to OUSD(P), rather than repeatedly
mischaracterizing these actions as "OUSD(P)" activities.
(U) These and other deficiencies of the Draft Report, discussed in these comments,
demonstrate that the OIG should reconsider its excursion into the policy and political
issue of whether the lawful and authorized activities under review were "appropriate."
111. OUSD(P) SUPPORT TO THE OIG REVIEW (U)
(U) To assist the OIG in its review, this office provided copies of the thousands of
pages of documents that we had already provided to the SSCI and to Senator Levin. We
also provided various additional materials that the OIG requested. In addition, we
arranged for the OIG to review certain documents that DoD had earlier declined to
provide the Congress. We offered OIG the opportunity to review some ten file boxes
containing all the documents we had collected in the course of our initial search in
response to the SSCI's and Senator Levin's document requests, including documents that
on review we had determined to be unresponsive and thus did not provide to Congress.
We also provided all witnesses that we were in a position to produce for interviews
requested by the OIG and suggested various additional individuals as possible witnesses.
IV. FACTS (U)
(U) Because of the need for a clear, complete and accurate account of the relevant
facts, we provide a detailed statement of facts below. Throughout the factual narrative,
we undertake to highlight the more significant factual errors in the Draft Report.
(U) A discussion section, examining the authorities and analysis set out in the
Draft Report, follows the statement of facts.
(U) The Draft Report does not explain the origin or context of the work under
review. By persistently mischaracterizing this work as "OUSD(P)" activities, the Draft
Report conveys an incorrect impression that this work was an "OUSD(P)" initiative
constituting an "inappropriate" intrusion into "intelligence functions that are the
responsibility of Defense Intelligence" (page 14). The Draft Report mentions that "some
of the actions were performed. in response to inquiries from the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and direction from the Secretary of Defense" (page 13), leaving the incorrect
impression that such actions were somehow incidental to other (unspecified) actions
attributable solely to the "OUSD(P)."
(U) In fact, all (not some) of the work characterized by the Draft Report as
"inappropriate," specifically, three versions of a draft briefing on links between Iraq and
al-Qaida and an internal staff memo done in preparation for the briefing, was in response
to requests and taskings by either the Deputy Secretary or the Secretary of Defense. The
Deputy Secretary directed that the draft briefing be prepared for the Secretary. After the
Secretary received the 'draft briefing, he directed that it be shared with the DCI. When
the Deputy National Security Advisor requested the draft briefing, the Deputy Secretary's
office directed that it be given to him. Three OSD staff members had the primary
responsibility to do this work. Two happened to be DIA analysts detailed to OUSD(P)
and the third worked directly for the Deputy Secretary as his Special Assistant.
(U) How and why these particular three individuals became involved in this work
were as follows:
A. Three Separate Activities Relating to the Work Under Review (U)
(U) There were three, initially separate, activities within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) that relate to the work under review in this Project. Some of
the individuals involved in these three activities, and some strands of their work,
eventually came together under the direction and oversight of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (DSD), who tasked certain work discussed below. That work, and certain
resulting draft documents (critiquing IC work on the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship), are the
actions that the Draft Report mischaracterizes as "alternative intelligence assessments"
and "Intelligence Activities."
(U) In its "Background" section the Draft Report discusses the OSP (page 3) but
fails to make clear in the text that the OSP had nothing to do with any of the activities
under review. None of this work or the resulting documents was done by, for, or under
the direction of the OSP. The work reviewed in this Project was substantially completed
before the OSP even came into de facto existence in mid-August 2002. (The Draft
Report states that OSP was created in October 2002; it was in that month that certain
formalities were implemented.) The Draft Report also errs in stating that the OSP was
"disbanded" in July 2003. In fact it was merely renamed as the Office of Northern Gulf
Affairs, remaining in NESA as before, and its personnel continued to perform their policy
functions regarding that region.
(U) Likewise, none of this work or the resulting documents was done by, for, or
under the direction of the PCTEG or the Policy Support Office as such.
(U) Nor did the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ever approve or adopt any
of the draft opinions or conclusions in any of the resulting documents as OUSD(P)
positions, views or conclusions.
1. The PCTEG (U)
(U) The first activity relevant here was an ad hoc group, formed by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) shortly after the 911 1 attacks. The mission of
that group was to review all available information about a number of international
terrorist organizations with a basic focus on the question: What does it mean to be at war
with a terrorist n e t ~ o r k ? ~ The Draft Report erroneously states that this group was formed
"to conduct an independent analysis of the al-Qaida terrorist network" (page 2). In fact,
the group's work was not limited to al-Qaida but addressed more generally various major
terrorist groups and their relations with their state sponsors. This group commenced
work in approximately October 2001 with two members: a consultant, and a detailee
from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The group requested and received relevant
intelligence information from the Intelligence Community and did preliminary work on
the subject assigned. Both members, however, left for other duties towards the end of
2001 and the beginning of 2002. Neither of them ever worked in or took direction from
the OSP or the Policy Support Office.
(U) In January 2002 the USDP decided to continue the project in a more formal
way, by naming .the project the "Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group" (PCTEG)
and formally requesting detailees from DIA. The memo approving creation of the
PCTEG described its task as follows:
(U) Study al-Qaida's worldwide organization including its suppliers, its relations
with States and with other terrorist organizations (and their suppliers).
(U) Identify "chokepoints" of cooperation and coordination.
(U) Identify vulnerabilities.
(U) Recommend strategies to render the terrorist networks ineffective.''
(U) Also, as early as January 2002, the Deputy Secretary among others was raising
questions about possible links between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network." In
addition to the information and analyses he regularly received through established
9 (U) Statement of Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, on the Policy Counter
Terrorism Evaluation Group, before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, 10 July 2003,
USDP and Senator Levin Correspondence, November 03-July 05, Tab 14.
10 (U) Memo from ASD (ISA) to USDP (3 1 January 2002), USDP Congressional Correspondence
November 02-February 04, Tab 1 8.
11 (U) Memo from DSD to USDP (22 January 2002), reproduced as Appendix E to the Draft Report.
intelligence channels, the Deputy also asked for input from OUSD(P), including in a
memo to the USDP on January 22, 2002.12 He received a reply from the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on January 24,2002, summarizing
information suggesting "few direct links" and other information "suggesting more robust
indirect links."13 There was nothing unusual or improper about this. How to assess the
information provided by the IC and what, if any, decisions to make or conclusions to
draw from it are central responsibilities of the Deputy and other senior policy officials of
the Defense Department. It was not remarkable that the Deputy consulted OSD policy
offices as well as the IC on possible links between Iraq and al-Qaida.
(U) In February 2002 USDP requested the Director of DIA to provide three
detailees to the PCTEG.'~ In response, DIA provided two of the three individuals
requested, both reserve Naval intelligence officers then assigned to the 5-2. Contrary to
the Draft Report (page 2), these officers were not detailed to OUSD(P) in October 2001;
rather, they were detailed in February 2002, as replacements for the two original
members of the PCTEG who were gone by the time the two DIA detailees arrived. One
of these DIA detailees departed in April 2002, leaving only one member of the "group,"
who continued to work as the sole member of the PCTEG until he was demobilized from
Naval reserve duty in January 2003. l5
(U) The PCTEG member who departed in April 2002 never worked in or took
direction from .the OSP or the Policy Support Office, nor did the sole remaining PCTEG
member at any time relevant here.16
(U) As originally conceived, the PCTEG was to function under the joint
chairmanship of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOILIC and the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NESA'? (not by the ASD (ISA) and ASD
(SOILIC) as the Draft Report incorrectly implies at page 2). But the group never had
l2 (U) Ibid.
l3 (U) Memo from ASD(1SA) to DSD (24 January 2002), reproduced as Appendix F to the Draft Report.
14 (U) Memo for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (2 February 2002), ibid.
l5 (U) Roster of PCTEG and Special Plans/Northern Gulf, USDP Congressional Correspondence
November 02-February 04, Tab 16A.
l6 (U) After being demobilized from Naval reserve duty in 2003, the former single remaining PCTEG
member did return to OUSD(P) and worked as a civilian in OSP for a time, but that was after the work
relevant to this Project had been completed.
17 (U) Memo from ASD (ISA) to USDP (3 1 January 2002), USDP Congressional Correspondence
November 02-February 04, Tab 18.
more than two members and soon dwindled to one; thus it never attained the degree of
operational formality implied by this nominal joint chairmanship. When the DSD began
to take a more active role on the specific issue of the relationship between Iraq and al-
Qaida, as discussed below, the single remaining member of the PCTEG participated with
others in replying to DSD taskings and at times responded directly to the DSD in that
regard. At no time did the PCTEG report to or take direction from the OSP or the Policy
Support Office.
(U) The PCTEG produced a 154-page draft briefin entitled "Understanding the P Strategic Threat of Terror Networks and their ~~onsors,"' which was revised and
updated periodically. Consistent with the mission of the PCTEG, this briefing examined
the methods and operations of various terrorist organizations (including but not limited to
al-Qaida), the nature of their ties with their state sponsors, and various policy
considerations on dealing with the threat posed by these groups.
(U) This briefing was the sole substantive work product by the PCTEG as such.
The briefing was separate from the work, addressed in the Draft Report, on the specific
issue of the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship.19 The PCTEG briefing was an internal Policy
staff-level product that was never presented outside the Policy organization and never
approved by senior policy makers as an official OUSD(P) position, so far as any facts
known to us are concerned, and the Draft Report does not contend otherwise. Indeed, the
Draft Report only briefly mentions but does not discuss this solitary PCTEG product.
(U) The Draft Report mischaracterizes events in stating (page 3) that the one
remaining PCTEG member created a briefing in the summer of 2002 on links between
Iraq and al-Qaida "with the assistance of a member of OUSD(P)'s Policy Support Office
and a Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense." Here and throughout, the
Draft Report ignores or downplays the central fact that the Deputy Secretary of Defense
directed the work to be done, as discussed more fully below. He gave the assignment
initially to his Special Assistant, not to the sole PCTEG member or the Policy Support
Office staffer or anyone else in OUSD(P). The latter two individuals did participate in
responding to the Deputy Secretary because of the circumstances explained in these
comments. But it is a gross distortion to suggest, as the Draft Report does, that the sole
PCTEG member originated this effort or that it was an OUSD(P) activity.
(U) The Draft Report also mischaracterizes events in stating (at page 3) that
"OUSD(P) dissolved the PCTEG shortly" after the draft briefing was given to the Deputy
'* (U) Ibid, Tab 1 5.
19 (U) Although this PCTEG briefing was separate from the work on the specific issue of the Iraq-al-
Qaida relationship done elsewhere in OSD, it obviously overlapped to a degree and eventually led to the
one remaining PCTEG member's being included in the work on that single issue.
National Security Advisor and the Vice President's Chief of Staff in September 2002.
There was no formal action dissolving the PCTEG; rather, the "group" withered away
when its sole remaining member was demobilized from Naval reserve duty in 2003.
2. The DIA Analyst Detailed to the Policy Support Office (U)
(U) The second activity relating to the work under review was begun by a career
DIA analyst whom DIA had detailed, in January 2002, to the former Policy Support
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Support) in OUSD(P). At no
time did this detailee work in or take direction from the OSP or the PCTEG.
(U) DIA detailed this analyst in response to the USDP's by-name request.
Although the Draft Report states (page 2) that the Policy Support Office requested this
DIA analyst due "to the voluminous amounts of intelligence the office was receiving but
was unable to assess," the quoted phrase does not appear in USDP's request. This
analyst was a 25-year intelligence veteran who, at the time of USDP's request, was
assigned to the Interagency Damage Assessment Team for the Robert Hanssen case. This
analyst had had previous experience, inter alia, providing intelligence support to policy
levels as well as experience in Foreign Denial and Deception analysis that the USDP
needed to support certain intelligence-related duties then assigned to the Policy Support
( This analyst was tasked in the Policy Support Office to provide policy
support for special access programs and to carry out other duties requiring a review of
various intelligence products. Sometime in early 2002, in the course of her work, she
came across a finished 1998 CIA report on Iraq's 3
. The report mentioned that Usama Bin Laden had requested and received certain
training from an Iraqi service. On her own initiative, she requested and
received through CIA channels the underlying information on which the item was based,
consisting of two Memo Dissems, and subsequently obtained additional CIA reports from
DIA and CIA on the issue of Iraq and a l - ~ a i d a . ~ ~
(U) As this was the only reporting that this analyst had seen on Bin Laden in this
connection, and because she considered it important data for a discussion on Iraqi
intelligence and al-Qaida, she wrote a one-page "assessment" (in her words) of the IC
reporting and gave it to the DUSD (PS), ASD (ISA), USDP, and DSD."
20 (U) Memo from USDP to Director, DIA (23 November 2001), USDP CongressionaI Correspondence
November 02-Februa y 04, Tab 17; Memorandum for the Record (30 October 2002), ibid.
21 (U) Memorandum for the Record (17 April 2002), Memorandum for the Record (30 October 2002),
USDP Congressional Correspondence November 02-Februu y 04 Tabs 17 and 18.
22 (U) Memorandum for the Record (17 April 2002), ibid at Tab 17
(U) Again on her own initiative, in early spring 2002 the analyst met with the chief
of DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF) and gave him a
copy of the reference in the finished CIA report, the two underlying reporting documents,
and her one-pager. (This one-pager should not be confused, as the Draft Report seems to
do, with a later, July 25,2002 internal memo that this analyst wrote in preparation for the
August 2002 briefing to the Secretary of Defense, discussed below.23) She recommended
that the JITF publish the IC reporting data "so that it would be available to the entire IC
because reports published previously did not contain this important data" and that,
without it, "analysis of the subject would be incomplete and inaccurate in the fut~re."'~
Over the next two weeks she spoke twice with the JITF chief, who told her he had given
the materials to the J-2's senior analyst but had heard nothing back.
(U) The analyst then called the J-2's senior analyst and again recommended that
the IC reporting information be published to ,the entire IC. The J-2 analyst responded that
"putting it out there would be playing into the hands of people like Wolfowitz," that the
information "was old" and "only a tid-bit," asked how did she "know that the information
was true," made a comment about trying to support "some agenda of eople in the
building," and bucked the issue of publication back to the JITF chief! The JITF took no
further action on the recommendation to publish the information, so far as we know.
(U) Meanwhile, the DIA analyst detailed to the Policy Support Office continued to
gather and review CIA material on Iraq and al-Qaida. At some point in April or May
23 (U) The Draft Report (page 8) states that this analyst attempted but failed to persuade the JITF Director
and the 5-2's senior analyst to publish as an "Intelligence Finding" a July 25,2002 memo, entitled "Iraq
and al-Qaida: Malung the Case." The July memo was an internal document that she wrote in preparation
for the SecDef briefing, as discussed more fully below. Nothing in the record known to us indicates any
attempt to obtain IC concurrence with the content of the July 25,2002 memo, nor was there any
requirement to do so. Comments to that effect in the Draft Report seem to be a mistaken reference to the
earlier effort, in the spring of 2002, to persuade the IC to publish intelligence reports the analyst had
found about Iraqi training provided to Bin Laden. The Draft Report claims that "OUSD(P) proceeded to
disseminate" the briefing to the SecDef despite being "unsuccessful in convincing the Intelligence
Community to publish the alternative intelligence assessments as an Intelligence Finding." This claim is
wrong. There was no attempt to get the IC to publish "alternative intelligence assessments," there was no
requirement to do so, there was no requirement for IC concurrence on the briefing the DSD had directed
to be given to the SecDef, and neither the July memo nor the August 2002 briefing contained any
"alternative intelligence assessment."
24 (U) Memorandum for the Record (1 7 April 2002), USDP Congressional Correspondence November
02-February 04, Tab 17.
25 (U) Ibid. Judging from this response, the J-2's senior analyst may have been unfamiliar with DIA's DI
Policy No. 005 (5 June 2001), the first sentence of which states, "Curiosity and integrity are the hallmarks
of good analysis."
2002, she became aware of the broader work by the PCTEG on various terrorist
26 organizations.
3. The Deputy Secretary's Tasking to Brief the Secretary of Defense (U)
(U) Soon thereafter, in approximately July 2002, the DSD initiated the third strand
of work relevant here - the strand that resulted in the activities labeled as "inappropriate"
in the Draft Report. Specifically, the DSD directed his Special ~ s s i s t a n t ~ ~ to prepare a
briefing for the Secretary of Defense on Iraq and links to al-Qaida, based on a review "in
a different framework" of IC reports on connections between al-Qaida and ~ r a ~ . ~ ' In
particular, this review was motivated by the issue of whether there was any a priori
reason to believe that ideological opponents, (e.g., secular Iraqi Baathists and Islamic
extremists) would never cooperate against a common foe. By this point in time, the
DSD's Special Assistant, the DIA analyst detailed to the Policy Support Office, and the
single remaining member of the PCTEG had all become aware of the separate but related
work of each. Accordingly, the three of them collaborated in preparing the briefing for
the Secretary of Defense as directed by the DSD.
(U) The record does not support the Draft Report's assertion (page 12) that the
Deputy Secretary asked for an "intel briefing" when he tasked his Special Assistant to
prepare the briefing for the Secretary on Iraq and al-Qaida. That characterization only
appears in an internal e-mail, the author of which was not present when the Deputy gave
the tasking and had no personal knowledge of how the Deputy in fact formulated his
instruction^.^^
(U) The Report makes much of an internal July 25,2002 memo entitled "Iraq and
al-Qaida: Making the Case." This memo is dated after its author, the DIA detailee to
Policy Support, learned of DSD's instruction to his Special Assistant to prepare the
briefing for the Secretary of ~efense" and, according to its author, was done preliminary
26 (U) Memorandum for the Record (30 October 2002), USDP Congressional Correspondence November
02-February 04, Tab 18.
27 (U) DSD's Special Assistant at the time was an individual detailed to DSD from the Policy
organization. At all relevant times this Special Assistant reported directly to, and took direction
exclusively from, the DSD. At no time did the Special Assistant work in or take direction from the OSP,
the PCTEG, or the Policy Support Office.
28 (U) Explanatory Note to E-Mail of 7/22/02, USLIP Congressional Correspondence November 02-
February 04, Tab 17.
29 (U) Ibid.
30 (U) E-mail dated July 22,2202, USDP Congressional Correspondence November 02-February 04, Tab
17.
to that briefing.31 The Report asserts (page 6) that this memo constituted an
"OUSD(P). . . alternative intelligence asse~sment."~' The Report claims that there was
then a "translation of that alternative intelligence assessment" into the briefing for the
Secretary of Defense, which "translation" the Draft Report characterizes (page 6) as an
"Intelligence Activity, and more specifically, Intelligence Production" on the part of
OUSD(P).
(U) To the contrary, the July 25,2002 memo was not an "OUSD(P)" assessment
of any sort, let alone an "alternative intelligence assessment." Nor was it an "Intelligence
Finding" as the Draft Report misleading implies (page 6). It was, rather, a staff-level
memo containing only two introductory paragraphs of commentary, followed by a list
summarizing various IC reports on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida.
(U) The Draft Report erroneously asserts (page 9) that the memo described these
as "known" contacts. It does not. The phrase "known contacts" does not appear in the
memo.
(U) The two introductory paragraphs of the July 25 memo read as follows:
(U)33 Some analysts have argued that Usama Bin Laden would not
cooperate with secular Arab regimes such as Iraq because of differences in
ideological and religious beliefs. Reporting indicates otherwise. In fact, a
body of intelligence reporting for over a decade from varied sources reflects a
pattern of Iraqi support for al-Qaida activities. The covert nature of the
relationship makes it difficult to know the extent of that support. Moreover,
intelligence gaps exist because of ... Iraq's need to cloak its activities, thus
preventing collection of information on additional contacts between Iraq and
al-Qaida.
(u)" Published intelligence analyses continue to suggest that ties
between Iraq and al-Qaida are not "solid" or "provable." Intelligence
31 (U) Letter from USDP to Hon. Pat Roberts (June 29,2004), USDP Congressional Correspondence
March 04-August 04, Tab 30.
32 (U) In contrast, the DL4 Senior Intelligence Analyst in the JITF-CT said that the memo had "no
intelligence value" because, in the words of the Draft Report, it "contradicted the Intelligence Community
assessments.. . ." (Draft Report page 9).
33 (U) The original version of this paragraph was classified. The classified information has been omitted
and the paragraph declassified accordingly.
34 (U) The original version of this paragraph was classified because of content in the bullets that followed
it. Those bullets have been omitted here, and the paragraph declassified accordingly.
assessments do not require juridical evidence to support them. Legal
standards for prosecution needed in law enforcement do not obtain in
intelligence assessments, which look at trends, patterns, capabilities, and
intentions. Based on these criteria, the following information clearly makes
the case for an Intelligence Finding - that Iraq has been complicit in
supporting al-Qaida terrorist activities."
(U) The Draft Report does not define the term "intelligence assessment," and we
are not aware of a commonly accepted definition. But it is apparent that the abovequoted
paragraphs are merely making an argument that the Intelligence Community
should make an "Intelligence Finding" that Iraq had been complicit in supporting al-
Qaida terrorist activities. Considering the far more explicit statements to Congress about
Iraqi assistance to al-Qaida by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) himself,
discussed below, the quoted comments by DIA's detailee to Policy hardly seem extreme.
In any case they do not rise to the level of an "intelligence assessment" by the
"OUSD(P)" or an "Intelligence Finding" by anyone.
(U) The Draft Report asserts (page 8) that "OUSD(P) disseminated alternative
intelligence assessments without Intelligence Community consensus to senior decisionmakers."
The Draft Report asserts (page 8) that OUSD(P) should have followed
procedures contained in DIA's DI Policy No. 005 (5 June 2001), which allegedly
"detailed appropriate methods within Defense Intelligence for addressing alternative
judgments in those rare instances where consensus could not be reached."
(U) These assertions are wrong. Apart from the fact that the work was not
"OUSD(P)" assessments and not in any case "intelligence assessments," the Draft Report
ignores the fact that the Deputy Secretary had asked for a critical reading by non-IC staff
members of assessments already provided by the IC. He had not asked for an alternative
intelligence judgment and specifically directed that a "consensus" with the IC was not the
purpose of this work. As the Deputy wrote in a memo after the briefing to the Secretary:
"That was an excellent briefing. The Secretary was very impressed. He asked us
to think about some possible next steps to see if we can illuminate the differences
between us and the CIA. The goal is not to produce a consensus product, but
rather to scrub one another's arguments" (emphasis in original).36
(U) It would have been contrary to the Deputy's direction, not to say futile, for the
staffers doing this work to have sought an IC consensus on what was specifically
35 (U) The full text of the July 25,2002 memo is attached as Tab 2 to Letter from USDP to Hon. Pat
Roberts (June 29,2004), USDP Congressional Correspondence March 04-August 04, Tab 30.
36 (U) Memo from Paul Wolfowitz to Tina Shelton, et al. (8 August 2002), USDP Congressional
Correspondence November 02-Februaly 04, Tab 17.
intended as a critique of IC work, not as a competing "intelligence assessment." Yet ,the
OIG apparently believes that it would have been more appropriate for these staff
members to have disregarded the Deputy's direction.
(U) Even if the objective had been to obtain an "alternative intelligence judgment"
from the IC, which the Draft Report inexplicably seems to say was or should have been
the case, neither DI Policy No. 005 nor DI Policy No. 004 (also cited by the Draft Report)
provides any procedure whatever for the DIA's customers to obtain such an alternative
judgment. Both documents are confined solely to situations in which a DIA analyst,
working as such within DIA, wishes to put forward an alternative analysis or alternative
judgment through DIA's chain of command. In the present case, one of the individuals
responding to the Deputy's tasking had no connection with DIA at all, and the other two
were working in policy positions on detail to OUSD(P). There is no factual or legal basis
for the Draft Report's assertion that these internal DIA policies continued to apply to
these detailees while assigned to OUSD(P). The full texts of these internal DIA policies
are attached at Appendix A.
(U) The Report claims (page 8) that the DIA detailee who wrote the July 25,2002
memo "requested first from the Director of the Joint Intelligence Task Force for
Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) and then the Joint Staff 52's Senior Analyst to publish
the alternative intelligence assessment as an 'Intelligence Finding,"' rather than using
"the standard process of coordinating to obtain consensus from the Intelligence
Community" or to "follow the procedures for developing an Alternative Judgment."
Apart from the mischaracterization of this memo as an "alternative intelligence
assessment," the Draft Report lends great weight to this supposed failure in obtaining IC
concurrence, stating (page 8) that "OUSD(P) proceeded to disseminate the August 2002
briefing" to the Secretary though having been "unsuccessful in convincing the
Intelligence Community to publish the alternative intelligence assessments as an
Intelligence Finding."
(U) As noted above, this comment may be a mistaken reference to an earlier
unsuccessful attempt by the DIA detailee to persuade the JITF to publish intelligence
reports she had found on certain training provided to Bin Laden by Iraqi services.
Whether or not the memo's author attempted to coordinate it with the JITF or 5-2, there
was no requirement to do so since the memo was an internal Policy staff product done in
preparation for a briefing that the DSD had directed his staff to prepare for the Secretary
of Defense.
(U) It bears emphasis that the DSD gave this direction to his staff, not to the
Intelligence Community, as discussed above. Presumably the OIG has interviewed the
former DSD to explore his reasons for so doing, though the Draft Report does not
eluci.date this. The written record seems clear, however, that the DSD was not seeking to
have the IC publish an "Intelligence Finding" and was expressly not trying to produce a
consensus product with the IC. Rather, he wanted a critique from a policy perspective of
information already provided by the Intelligence Community, followed by an exchange
of views with the IC to see how the various arguments might hold up in the give and take
of vigorous debate.
B. Draft Briefing to the Secretary of Defense (U)
(U) The briefing, marked "draft," was given to the Secretary on August 8,2002~~
and became the first of three versions of the briefing as explained below, all of which
were marked as "Draft" or "Draft Working Entitled "Assessing the
Relationship Between Iraq and a1 Qaida," the briefing summarized existing intelligence
products and traffic on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. The briefing asked but did
not directly answer the following "Key Questions":
(U) "What is the probability that there are contacts between Iraq and a1
Qaida?"
(U) "What is the probability that there is cooperation regard.ing such
support functions as finances, expertise, training and logistics?"
(U) "What is .the probability that Iraq and a1 Qaida actually coordinate on
decisions or operations?"
(U) "What is probability that if a relationship existed, Iraq and a1 Qaida
could conceal its depth and characteristics from the United States?"
The briefing then identified various areas of activity in which Iraq and al-Qaida might
have an incentive to cooperate, and for each area summarized the available intelligence
relating to Iraq's and al-Qaida's actions in those areas over time.
(U) One slide entitled "What Would Each Side Want From a Relationship?" lists
several categories of potential Iraqi and al-Qaida objectives that each side might help the
other in fulfilling (e.g., training, financing, disruption of Kurdish opposition, etc.). It is
specifically in regard to these categories that the briefing slide stated "Intelligence
indicates cooperation in all categories; mature, symbiotic relationship."
37 (U) Memo from Paul Wolfowitz to ~ i n a Shelton, et al. (8 August 2002), USDP Congressional
Correspondence November 02-February 04, Tab 17.
38 (U) All three versions of the briefing are attached to Letter from USDP to Hon. Carl Levin (25 March
2004), USDP and Senator Levin Correspondence, November 03-July 05, Tab 9.
(U) The Draft Report (page 6) misquotes this slide by transforming the subjunctive
question in the slide's title ("what would each side want.. .?") into an unconditional
assertion of "what each side wants from a relationship."
(U) Contrary to the Draft Report's mischaracterizations (e.g., page 8), the briefing
did not assert that intelligence indicated cooperation in all categories of possible endeavor
or a mature, symbiotic relationship in all respects, and "OUSD(P)" most certainly never
so contended. No category listed on this slide, and nothing elsewhere in any version of
the draft briefing, referred to cooperation in the conduct of specific terrorist operations or
to cooperation in operations of any sort.
(U) Here and throughout, the Draft Report misstates what the draft briefing said.
It overstates the briefing's caveated observations as "assessments" and "conclusions,"
always arbitrarily attributed to "OUSD(P)."
(U) The whole thrust of the draft briefing was to examine the question, in response
. to DSD's tasking, whether existing intelligence might suggest alternative interpretations
if one assumed that Iraq and al-Qaida might be willing to cooperate in a relationship that
both would have compelling reasons to hide, and to ask what each side might want from
such a relationship.
(U) The question was pertinent because a contrary assumption underpinned a
considerable part of the IC analysis, namely, that Iraq's secular Baathist regime and
Islamic extremists such as al-Qaida would not cooperate because of their ideological and
religious differences. The Draft Report fundamentally errs in failing to review the draft
briefing in the light of its purpose - to respond to DSD's request for an alternative view
based on an alternative assumption.
(U) Each version of the draft briefing included a slide entitled "Findings." None
of these "findings" asserted cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaida in all possible
categories of endeavors or a mature relationship in general. The "findings" in their
entirety were as follows:
(U) "More than a decade of numerous contacts"
(U) "Multiple areas of cooperation"
(U) "Shared anti-US goals and common bellicose rhetoric
-- Unique in calling for killing of Americans and praising 911 1"
(U) "Shared interest and pursuit of WMD"
(U) "[One indication of13' [One possible indication of140 [Some indications
of possible]41 Iraqi coordination with a1 Qaida specifically related to 911 1"
(U) "Relationship would be compartmented by both sides, closely guarded
secret, indications of excellent operational security by both parties"
(U) The reference to possible "coordination with a1 Qaida specifically related to
911 1" was at no time presented as a conclusion that Iraq and al-Qaida had in fact
cooperated in regard to the 911 1 attacks.
(U) Furthermore, both versions briefed outside the Defense Department were
caveated by the word "possible" in reference to "coordination." And all three versions of
the draft briefing included an additional caveat, in a slide preceding the "Findings" slide,
stating that "jiragmentary reporting points to possible Iraqi involvement" in 911 1 and
previous al-Qaida attacks (emphasis added).
(U) These caveated statements in the draft briefing were not "OUSD(P)"
"assessments" and were not presented as such at any of the three presentations of the
briefing.
(U) The Draft Report errs in its repeated assertion (e.g., page 7) that "OUSD(P)
assessed the Iraq - al-Qaida relationship as having a higher degree of cooperation than
those conclusions supported by the Intelligence Community." As discussed above, the
draft briefing was more conditional and less certain in its discussion of "possible"
cooperation than the Draft Report asserts.
(U) On the other hand, the DCI's statements on the subject - which the Draft
Report does not address - were more robust than the OIG admits. The Draft Report
attempts to portray a wide gulf between the draft briefing's observations and the IC's
assessments by quoting from IC products stating that there are "no conclusive signs of
cooperation on specific terrorist operations" and no "compelling evidence demonstrating
direct cooperation" (page 7). But, as discussed, the draft briefing never asserted that
there was any operational relationship or any cooperation on specific terrorist operations.
(U) In any event the draft briefing was not an "OUSD(P)" assessment of any sort.
Nowhere did any version of the draft briefing state that it presented an "OUSD(P)"
position or assessment, the USD(P) never approved or represented the draft briefing as an
39 (U) Version briefed to the Secretary of Defense.
40 (U) Version briefed to the DCI.
41 (U) Version briefed to the Deputy National Security Advisor.
"OUSD(P)" assessment, the Draft Report cites no facts supporting its repeated assertions
to the contrary, and there are none.
C. The Secretary of Defense's Direction to Brief DCI, Draft Briefing to DCI, CIA
Meeting (U)
(U) After receiving the briefing on August 8,2002, the Secretary of Defense
directed that it be given to the DCI, which was done on August 15,2002 at the CIA.^^
The USDP attended this meeting and was accompanied by two of the authors of the
briefing. At the outset of the meeting the USDP made a statement stressing that this
briefing was merely one way of looking at the underlying information, that no one was
saying it was necessarily the correct way, and that there were also other ways to view the
information. In other words, he made clear that the briefing was for the purpose of
discussion and was not presented as an approved OSD or OUSD(P) position.
(U) The draft briefing as given to the DCI did not include a slide entitled
"Fundamental Problems with How Intelligence Community is Assessing Information"
that was included in the other two versions. This slide criticized the IC for applying an
overly strict "juridical" standard in its assessments of the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship,
underestimating the importance each side would attach to hiding a relationship, and
making an assumption that secularists and Islamists would not cooperate even when they
had common interests. It was omitted from the DCI briefing because its critical tone at
the DCI-hosted meeting might have distracted from a discussion of the substance.43 Even
without the omitted slide, however, it was clear from the overall content that the draft
briefing was suggesting insufficient attention and analysis by the IC to a number of
intelligence reports on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida - a point that was made
explicitly at a subsequent meeting at CIA on August 20,2002, discussed below.
(U) The reference in the briefing to possible Iraqi coordination with al-Qaida
related to 911 1 was based on a report from the Czech intelligence service that future 911 1
highjacker Mohammad Atta had met with the Prague chief of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service in April 2001. All three versions of the draft briefing, including the one given to
the DCI, had a slide entitled "Summary of Known Iraq-a1 Qaida Contacts, 1990-2002"
that included the statement "2001: Prague IIS Chief al-Ani meets with Mohammad Atta
in April."
( Whether or not it was an overstatement to describe the reported Atta
meeting as a "known contact," the fact is that at the time of this briefing the Czech
intelligence service stood firmly by its report and apparently - 42 (U) SSCI Report, p. 362.
43 (U) Letter from USDP to Hon. Carl Levin (25 March 2004), USDP and Senator Levin Correspondence,
November 03-July 05, Tab 9.
relevant to this Project did the US Intelligence Community articulate and disseminate any
conclusive coordinated judgment that the reported Atta meeting did not occur.
(U) In any case all versions of the draft briefing merely spoke of an "indication" of
"coordination" regarding 911 1 in regard to this alleged meeting, both versions presented
outside the Defense Department added the further caveat of "possible," and no version of
the draft briefing asserted that Iraq and al-Qaida actually cooperated operationally or
otherwise in regard to the 911 1 attacks.
(U) Furthermore, during all times relevant to this Project the question of the
reported Atta meeting was well known and vigorously discussed throughout USG policy
and intelligence circles with responsibility for Iraq. There can be no doubt that all
recipients of the draft briefing, and most particularly the Secretary of Defense, the DCI,
the Deputy National Security Advisor and the Vice President's Chief of Staff, were aware
of the controversy surrounding the alleged meeting. They all were recipients of the IC's
judgments on this and related matters, both before and after receiving the draft briefing.
There is no factual basis whatever to suggest that any of them would have been misled by
anything about this meeting in any version of the draft briefing, or would have
misunderstood the draft briefing to be some sort of "intelligence assessment" by
OUSD(P).
(U) The DCI reportedly found the briefing The DCI asked the
OUSD(P) staffers to speak with the CIA'S NESA and CTC experts on Iraq and terrorism.
As a result, the two OUSD(P) staffers who briefed the DCI were invited to attend an
August 20,2002 meeting of analysts from the CTC, NESA, the National Security Agency
and the DIA who convened to discuss ongoing intelligence community work assessing
Iraq's links to terrorism. At the meeting the OUSD(P) staffers pointed out various
intelligence reports that had not been included in finished intelligence products and
suggested that such reports should be included. Some of their suggestions were adopted
and some were not.
(U) The Draft Report notes (page 10) that in this meeting the "CIA was even
willing to footnote its report with the OUSD(P) conclusions that differed from the
report's findings." In fact, there was no offer to footnote "OUSD(P) conclusions," and in
any case there were no "OUSD(P) conclusions" on the matter at hand, hence none to
44 (U) Memo Entitled "Quick Points on the Policy Team's Visit with DCI" (16 August 2002), USDP and
Senator Levin Correspondence, November 03-July 05, Tab 9.
footnote. Also, the OUSD(P) staffers in attendance did not decline footnotes because
they were "unable to speak for Defense Intelligence" as the Draft Report (page 10) puts
it, although in fact they were not. The actual exchange was simply this: One of the
OUSD(P) staffers (the DIA analyst to the Policy Support Office), when asked to prepare
footnotes on the issues with which she disagreed, declined to do so, stating that "I was an
employee in Policy, not wearing an intelligence hat. I could only ask why reporting was
not included in finished products and . . . make recommendations to include it."45
(U) In its unanimous report on pre-war intelligence issues in July 2004, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence stated that all attendees of the August 20,2002 meeting
"interviewed by .the Committee staff (eight of the twelve individuals) agreed that the
OUSDP staffers were not given special treatment[,] . . .their attendance contributed to a
,746 frank exchange of opinions" and they "played by IC rules.. . . The Committee Report
also noted more generally that:
"In some cases, those interviewed stated that the questions had forced them to go
back and review the intelligence reporting, and that during this exercise they came
across information they had overlooked in initial readings. The Committee found
that this process - the policyrnakers probing questions - actually improved the
Central Intelligence Agency's . . . products."47
D. Deputy National Security Advisor's Request, DSD's Direction, Draft Briefing to
Deputy National Security Advisor (U)
(U) The Draft Report mischaracterizes these events as "Dissemination of
OUSD(P)'s Alternative Intelligence Assessment to the White House" page 10). What
transpired is this:
(U) Following a reference to the briefing at a Deputies Committee meeting in
August 2002, the Deputy National Security Advisor requested to receive the briefing.
The Deputy DCI was a designated member of the Deputies Committee, and he or his
designee consistently attended its meetings. On the morning of September 16,2002, the
Deputy Secretary's office instructed the OUSD(P) staffers who had helped prepare the
draft brief to present it to the Deputy National Security Advisor and the Vice President's
Chief of Staff. They did so the same day at a meeting hosted by the Deputy National
Security Advisor in the Situation Room, with the Vice President's Chief of Staff
attending for at least part of the meeting.
45 (U) Memorandum for the Record (30 October 2002), USDP CongressionaI Correspondence November
02-Februaly 04, Tab 17.
46 (U) SSCI Report, pp. 362,363.
47 (U) SSCI Report, p. 34.
2 7
(U) The Draft Report fails to mention that the OUSD(P) staffers gave the
September 16 briefing because they were instructed to do so by the Deputy Secretary's
office in response to the Deputy National Security Advisor's request. The Draft Report
does correctly state (page 29) that there was no requirement for the DCI to be informed of
this meeting. One might reasonably observe that .there was no requirement because the
meeting was not an intelligence meeting.
(U) In any case, this version of the draft briefing, just as the previous two versions,
contained no intelligence assessment and was not presented as an official OUSD(P)
position. It was presented not as an intelligence briefing but as an alternative assessment
of IC reports, just as the prior two versions of the briefing.
(U) The Draft Report states (page 11) that this version of the draft briefing
included a "previously unseen" slide entitled "Facilitation: Atta Meeting in Prague."
The Draft Report fails to point out that the slide was "previously unseen" because it did
not previously exist. The Draft Report incorrectly asserts that this new slide presented
the alleged Atta meeting "as fact" (page 11). Nowhere does the slide describe the
meeting as "fact." To the contrary, the slide repeatedly uses phrases such as "Czech
service reports that Atta visited . . . ," "despite press reports of conflicting information,
Czech Interior Minister . . . stands by previous Czech . . . reporting," "Atta reportedly held
meetings.. . ," and "Atta reportedly arrives in Prague.. . . ,748
(U) Furthermore, the attendees at this version of the draft briefing were well
informed senior officials who had access to all the IC's most highly classified and
compartmented information on tlie subject of the alleged Atta meeting. The Deputy
National Security Advisor and the Vice President's Chief of Staff certainly were familiar
with the debate in the US Intelligence Community on this subject. It is ludicrous to
suggest that they would have mistaken this slide or anything else in the draft brief as firm
assertions of fact, much less as "intelligence assessments" by "OUSD(P)" or anyone else.
E. DCI's Congressional Statements on Iraq and al-Qaida (U)
(U) The Draft Report partially quotes from several IC reports, casting doubt on the
existence of any significant cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaida, in asserting that the
work under review overstated the degree of cooperation and hence "OUSD(P)" did not
provide "the most accurate analysis of intelligence" (page 11). As noted above, the
responsibility to provide "the most accurate analysis of intelligence" rests with the IC, not
OUSD(P). More importantly, senior decision-makers already had the 1C's reports and
assessments on Iraq and al-Qaida and thus already had "the most accurate analysis of
48 (U) USDP and Senator Levin Correspondence, November 03-July 05, Tab 9.
28
intelligence" -- if one accepts, as the Draft Report seems to do, that the IC's assessments
are the "most accurate".
(U) It is puzzling, therefore, that the Draft Report fails to discuss some of the most
authoritative articulations of the IC's analysis on Iraq and al-Qaida - the vetted,
coordinated correspondence and testimony by the DCI himself to the Congress. On
October 7, 2002, the DCI wrote to SSCI Chairman Graham, responding to various
questions raised in connection with the forthcoming debate on a joint resolution to
authorize military action against Iraq. Regarding questions about Iraqi links to al-Qaida,
the DCI wrote that Senators could draw from the following points for unclassified
discussions:
Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa'ida is
evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the
information we have received comes from detainees, including some of
high rank.
We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-
Qa'ida going back a decade.
(U) By comparison, the draft briefing referred to "more than a decade of numerous
contacts. The DCI's letter continued:
Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa'ida have discussed
safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression.
(U) The draft briefing referred to "safe haven of last resort" as an objective that al-
Qaida would want from a relationship with Iraq. The DCI's letter continued:
Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the
presence in Iraq of al-Qa'ida members, including some that have been
in Baghdad.
(U) The draft briefing said that "Iraq Has Provided Safe Haven for Key
Terrorists," among them al-Qaida members, including some in Baghdad. The DCI's
letter continued:
We have credible reporting that al-Qa'ida leaders sought contacts in
Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting
also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qa'ida members in the
areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs.
(U) The draft briefing said that Iraq and al-Qaida had a "shared interest and pursuit
of WMD," that "CBRN" would be an al-Qaida objective, and that al-Qaida had sought
bomb-making assistance. The DCI's letter continued:
Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with
growing indications of a relationship with al-Qa'ida, suggest that
Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent military
acti0n.4~
(U) In a prepared statement to the SSCI on February 11,2003, DCI Tenet said:
Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery and bomb-making
to al-Qa'ida. It also provided training in poisons and gasses to two al-Qa'ida
associates; one of these associates characterized the relationship he forged
with Iraqi officials as successful. Mr. Chairman, this information is based on
a solid foundation of intelligence. It comes to us from credible and reliable
(U) At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 12,2003, the
DCI stated:
[W]e also know from very reliable information that there's been some
transfer of training in chemical and biologicals [sic] from the Iraqis to a1 ~aeda."
(U) From these statements by .the DCI on behalf of the Intelligence Community, it
is clear that the IC "consensus" at the time ascribed considerably more "maturity" and
"symbiosis" to the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida than depicted in the Draft
Report. It is also clear that the Draft Report significantly overstates the degree and
significance of inconsistencies between the IC consensus and the draft briefing's
observations. In any case the draft briefing was nothing more than a draft, it was not an
"intelligence assessment," and it was not an "OUSD(P)" assessment or conclusion.
49 (U) Letter George Tenet, DCI, to Hon. Bob Graham, Chairman SSCI (7 October 2002), in E-Mail from
Michael H. Mobbs (OUSDP) to Charles E. Edge (OIG) (7 February 2006), at Tab C.
50 (U) "Administration Statements on Iraq Training a1 Qa'ida in Chemical and Biological Weapons,"
attached to Press Release by Senator Carl Levin Re: Levin Says Newly Declassified Information
Indicates Bush Administration's Use of Pre-War Intelligence Was Misleading (6 November 2005), in EMail
from Michael H. Mobbs (OUSDP) to Charles E. Edge (OIG) (7 February 2006), at Tab C.
51 (U) Ibid.
?O
V. DISCUSSION (U)
A. Why are Lawful and Authorized Activities Nevertheless Called
"Inappropriate"? (U)
(U) The Draft Report concludes that the activities reviewed in this Project were
lawful and authorized (pages ii, 4, 13). It states that within the authority conferred by
Title X, Section 113 of the United States Code, "the Secretary owns the DoD Directives
governing (among others) Intelligence and Policy, and as long as Executive Orders or
other legal statutes are not violated, he has the latitude to interchange roles and
responsibilities" (page 34).
(U) Despite these conclusions, the Draft Report asserts that these same activities
were "inappropriate," in the OIG's opinion, because the "OUSD(P)" "products did not
clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community and were, in
some cases, shown as intelligence products" (page 4).
(U) It is somewhat difficult to understand how activities that admittedly were
lawful and authorized (in this case by either the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of
Defense) could nevertheless be characterized as "inappropriate" -- particularly
considering OIG's concession that the Secretary (and by logical extension the Deputy)
may interchange roles and responsibilities within DoD provided no statutes or executive
orders are violated. The Draft Report points to no laws, executive orders, DoD
directives, DoD instructions or DoD publications that provide any guidelines for what is
"appropriate" in this case, except for the Secretary's broad mandate under Title X. That
mandate leads to a conclusion that the activities reviewed were "appropriate."
(U) The Draft Report is spare of analysis on why its reaches the opposite
conclusion. The argument seems to be as follows:
(U) DIA detailees to OUSD(P) reviewed the same intelligence information that the
IC had used when drawing IC judgments about links between Iraq and al-Qaida.
This was appropriate for policy formulation (page 12).
(U) Appropriate policy formulation, however, "evolved into Intelligence Analysis
and eventually culminated in the Intelligence Activity of Intelligence Production
with the creation of alternate intelligence assessments and dissemination when the
briefing was provided to the Secretary of Defense, DCI, and members of the
Office of the Vice President and National Security Counsel" (page 12).
(U) This supposed "evolution" was inappropriate because it led to performance by
"OUSD(P)" of "intelligence functions that are the responsibility of Defense
Intelligence" (page 14), the work products "did not clearly show the variance with
the consensus of the Intelligence Community" (page 4), and the work products
"were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products" (page 4).
(U) If "OUSD(P)" did not consider the IC's existing "judgment" about Iraq and al-
Qaida to be correct, "OUSD(P)" should have used "existing procedures" to get a
second IC "judgment" by requesting "from the Defense Intelligence community an
Alternative Judgment" on that subject (page$ 13-14) - instead of participating in
an OSD critique of the existing IC judgment as directed by the DSD. Such
"existing procedures" are said to be found in two internal DIA policies cited in the
Draft Report (DI Policy Nos. 004 and 005).
(U) It is apparent from the above summary that the Draft Report's conclusions
about "inappropriate" activities rest heavily on internal DIA policies dealing with
alternative IC assessments and judgments, as well as Intelligence Community concepts
such as "Intelligence Activities," "Intelligence Production," "Intelligence Analysis," and
"intelligence assessments." An examination of the DIA policies and relevant IC concepts
shows that they do not apply to the activities reviewed here. Thus the assertion that the
activities were "inappropriate" cannot withstand analysis.
(U) Before turning to the analytical errors in the Draft Report, however, we
respectfully point out that the specific reasons on which the Draft Report rests its finding
of "inappropriateness" do not bear scrutiny.
(U) First, the Draft Report claims that the work products were inappropriate
because they "did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence
Community." This fundamentally mischaracterizes the purpose and nature of the work.
The central purpose of these activities was to look critically at existing IC work and offer
a different way of understanding the IC information. Each version of the draft briefing
made this clear. The senior decision-makers briefed on this work (one of whom was the
DCI himself) did not need to be told that it was at variance with the IC in some respects;
that was inescapably obvious. There are no facts to suggest that any of them drew any
conclusions or made any decisions whatsoever solely on the basis of the draft briefing,
without taking IC views into con~ideration.~~
(U) Furthermore, there was no requirement to specify in a draft work product, not
offered as a proposed action item, how it might vary from IC views. The situation would
52 (U) It was not the place of OUSD(P) in any event to articulate what the IC "consensus" was, which
would have been the first step in "clearly show[ing] the variance" as the Draft Report asserts should have
been done. It was up to the IC to articulate its consensus, if it had one. The Draft Report itself shows the
pitfalls of trying to articulate an "IC consensus" for the IC. The Draft Report purports to describe such a
consensus but utterly fails to mention the DCI's vetted, cleared statements to Congress on the Iraq-al-
Qaida relationship. Those statements do not support the Draft Report's characterization of the IC
'6 consensus."
have been different if the draft briefing were put forward in support of some proposed
action or decision, for example, a proposal that the President make a speech to the Nation
describing a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida. In such a case, the matter would
have been discussed, at the least, by the Deputies Committee. All interested agencies
would have been asked to provide their views, in particular their comments on the draft
briefing and any other material offered in support of or against the proposed speech. The
IC would have had ample opportunity to articulate how its views did or did not vary from
the draft briefing. There would have been no need for "OUSD(P)" to do that; indeed, the
IC would no doubt have objected strenuously to the idea of having another agency
describe how its views might vary from those depicted in the draft briefing. Obviously,
nothing of the sort happened here.
(U) Second, the Draft Report asserts that the work was "inappropriate" because
some of it was "shown as intelligence products." There are no facts whatsoever to
support this statement. The Draft Report only gives one example, the July 25,2002
internal staff memo (done in preparation for the draft briefing), discussed at length in Part
IV above. That memo argued that the IC had sufficient information to make an
intelligence finding that Iraq had been "complicit in supporting al-Qaida terrorist
activities." The Draft Report mischaracterizes this memo as an "OUSD(P)" intelligence
assessment. In fact it was nothing more than a staff member's opinion that the IC should
make an intelligence finding.
(U) Third, the Draft Report considers the work reviewed inappropriate because it
amounted to "intelligence functions that are the responsibility of Defense Intelligence."
We explain below why the work was not "intelligence functions." But even accepting
that characterization for discussion purposes only, the Draft Report in this respect
contradicts its own admission that the Secretary "has the latitude to interchange roles and
responsibilities" in managing the Department so long as no statutes or executive orders
are violated. The Draft Report fails to explain why it was inappropriate for the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary to exercise that latitude in this case. If the OIG believes the
Deputy inappropriately used his latitude to assign this work to non-IC staff members, and
the Secretary and Deputy misused their latitude to direct that those staff members share
this work outside the Department, it is incumbent on the OIG to say so directly and to
explain why it holds this opinion. It is not sufficient for the OIG simply to fault
"OUSD(P)" with engaging in "inappropriate" behavior because two Policy staffers did as
told by the Secretary and Deputy, and let it go at that.
B. DIA's DI Policy Nos. 004 and 005 Do Not Apply to Non-IC Offices Directed by
Senior DoD Leaders to Critique Intelligence Community Work (U)
(U) The Draft Report cites Policy Nos. 004 and 005 developed by DIA's
Directorate for Analysis and Production. These internal policies set out guidelines and
procedures for DIA analysts who wish to propose, respectively, an alternative analysis or
an alternative judgment when they believe that they cannot reach a consensus with other
intelligence analysts on a particular issue. The Draft Report erroneously characterizes
these internal DI policies as "the standard process of coordinating to obtain consensus
from the Intelligence Community" that the DIA detailees to OUSD(P) should have used
in this case (page 8). The Draft Report also erroneously describes these internal policies
as the "existing procedures" (page 14) that OUSD(P) should use to "request that an
Alternative Judgment be produced by Defense Intelligence" if OUSD(P) believes that the
IC is incorrect on a given matter (page 13).
1. The Internal DIA Policies Do Not Apply to DIA Members While Detailed
to Policy Positions Outside DIA's Chain of Command (U)
(U) The texts of these internal DI policies are reproduced in full at Appendix A to
these comments. There is nothing in either of them to support the idea that they continue
to apply to DIA analysts who are detailed to policy positions and who are tasked to do
independent assessments for the express purpose of providing a non-IC critique, or
review, of IC views. It is obvious from the texts that they only apply to analysts working
within the DIA chain of command and proposing alternative assessments or judgments,
in an intelligence capacity, within that chain of command. DI Policy No. 005, for
example, provides that "the analyst forwards . . . through the immediate SupervisorIOffice
Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) to the Group SIOIResearch Director (RD). The
Supervisors/Office SIOs review . . . for format and completeness. The Group SIOIRD
reviews . . . to ensure it accurately describes the competing analyses," etc. This process
has no relevance to a situation such as the present, where the Deputy Secretary
specifically directed that he wanted an alternative look at the IC's work from outside the
IC and was not seeking to develop a consensus.
2. The Internal DIA Policies Contain No Procedure for an IC Customer to
Obtain an Alternative IC Judgment, Which in any Case is not What the DSD
Sought Here (U)
(U) Neither of these internal DI policies contains any procedure for an IC
customer, such as OUSD(P), to request an "alternative judgment" from the DIA if the
customer considers an existing IC judgment to be incorrect. While the Draft Report
inexplicably allows that OUSD(P) "is not . . . required to await final adjudication or
production of an Alternative Judgment from DIA" (page 13), thus raising the question of
why the "Alternative Judgment" should be sought at all, the fact remains that these
internal DI policies do not provide for a customer to make such a request. One will
search the texts in vain for even the slightest hint of such a procedure.
(U) The very notion that a customer should ask the IC for an alternative
intelligence judgment if it dislikes the judgment already given is bizarre on its face. Such
a request would inevitably bring down a firestorm of criticism that the customer was
attempting to "politicize" intelligence or "pressure" the intelligence analysts into
changing their assessments. In any event, the Deputy Secretary in the present matter
expressed no wish for an "alternative judgment" from the IC, which is undoubtedly why
the staffers responding to his tasking did not seek one. And he expressly directed that the
objective of the work was not to develop a consensus product but rather to see how
competing arguments might stand up in an exchange of views with the IC.
3. The Internal DIA Policies Were Not Coordinated or Published as Would
Have Been Required if Intended to Apply Outside DIA (U)
(U) There is no basis for asserting that the DI internal policies are applicable to
DoD as a whole or to OUSD(P) in particular. To the contrary, these policies have not
been published; they have not been disseminated to OUSD(P) or, so far as we know,
elsewhere in the Department outside DIA; and they have not been presented to OUSD(P)
for review or coordination.
(U) Guidance that is intended to have Departmental applicability falls within the
requirements of DoD Directive No. 5025.1, "DoD Directives System," July 27,2000, as
reissued July 14,2004. Section 4.1 of this directive articulates a DoD policy to maintain
"a single, streamlined, uniform system governing the preparation, coordination, approval,
publication, dissemination, implementation, and internal review of DoD issuances.. . ."
Proposed DoD issuances "shall be formally coordinated to solicit the views of the Heads
of the DoD Components" (Section 4.4). All DoD issuances "must be coordinated with
the General Counsel, DoD, the Inspector General, DoD, and the Director of
Administration and Management" (Section 4.4.1). The Heads of DoD Components
"shall review and coordinate on proposed DoD issuances relevant to their missions"
(Section 5.4).
(U) Nothing of the sort was done with regard to DI Policy Nos. 004 and 005.
They have no applicability to OUSD(P). They are not "existing procedures" that
OUSD(P) should have, or could have, followed in the present matter. The Draft Report's
recommendation that they be followed as "existing procedures" in the future is
unfounded and inappropriate.
C. "Intelligence Activities" Constitute a Process Using All Key Elements of
Intelligence Work By Intelligence Agencies (U)
(U) As the guidance cited by the Draft Report (page 4-5, Appendix H) and other
relevant authorities make clear, "Intelligence Activities" involve the entire process by
which intelligence agencies turn information into a product that intelligence consumers
can use. They do not encompass the type of work reviewed here.
(U) In asserting otherwise, the Report relies primarily on DoD Directive No.
5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities, April 25, 1988, and DoD Directive No. 5 105.2 1,
"Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," February 18, 1997. Of these, only DoD Directive
No. 5240.1 (Section 3.1) contains a definition of "Intelligence Activities" which is as
follows:
"Intelligence activities. The collection, production, and dissemination of foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence by DoD intelligence components authorized
under reference (b) ."
(U) "Reference (b)" is Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
Activities," December 4, 198 1, Section 3.4(e) of which defines "intelligence activities" as
"all activities that agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct
pursuant to this Order." Section 3.4(f) defines "Intelligence Community and agencies
within the Intelligence Community" as "the following agencies or organizations," among
which the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense do not appear.
(U) DoD Directive No. 5240.1, Section 3.4, similarly defines "DoD intelligence
components" as "[all1 DoD Components conducting intelligence activities, including" a
list of named DoD elements among which, again, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense do not appear. In contrast Section 2.1
of DoD Directive No. 5240.1 does define "DoD Components" to include the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Thus the Directive carefully distinguishes "all DoD Components"
from "DoD Components conducting intelligence activities." In consequence, the
Directive's Section 3.1 definition of "Intelligence Activities" by its terms only
encompasses "DoD intelligence components," not "all DoD Components."
(U) The above definitions make clear that "Intelligence Activities" constitute a
process that entails collection, production "and" (not "or") dissemination of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence as conducted by intelligence agencies, and not
assessments or critiques by non-intelligence offices.
(U) Various definitions in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1 2 April 200 1, as amended through 16
October 2006) ("JP 1-02") also demonstrate that the term "Intelligence Activities" should
be understood as a process of actions and operations conducted by the Intelligence
Community to produce an intelligence product for consumers. For example, according to
JP 1-02:
"intelligence" means "[tlhe product resulting from the collection, processing,
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information
concerning foreign countries or areas" (JP1-02 at 268);
"intelligence process" means "[tlhe process by which information is converted
into intelligence and made available to users. The process consists of six
interrelated intelligence operations: planning and direction, collection, processing
and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and
evaluation and feedback" (JP 1-02 at 270); and
"intelligence community" means "[all1 departments or agencies of a government
that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial,
support, or participatory role" (JP 1-02 at 269).
(U) None of the above definitions accurately describe the critical assessment of IC
information by OSD staff members that is the subject of this review.
D. Alternative or Critical Assessments of IC Information and IC Judgments by
Non-IC Offices Are Not "Intelligence Activities" (U)
(U) As the above definitions of "Intelligence Activities" and related terms make
clear, such activities consist of the entire process of actions and operations conducted by
intelligence agencies to produce an intelligence product for consumers. It is incorrect to
select one or a few activities that are part of the "intelligence process" and characterize
those selected activities as "Intelligence Activities" even when conducted by non-IC
policy elements of government.
(U) The definitions of "Intelligence Activities" and related terms do not
encompass an alternative or critical analysis, evaluation, interpretation or assessment by a
non-IC office, such as OSD or OUSD(P), of information provided by the Intelligence
Community. In this context, the "analysis," etc. is merely an independent review by a
non-IC organization, or in the present case by several non-IC OSD staffers, of IC
information provided by the IC. In conducting this review, the non-IC organization may
even exercise independent judgment about the meaning or significance of the intelligence
information provided by the IC. This act of independent judgment by the non-IC
organization does not constitute "Intelligence Activities" under any of the above
definitions or any common-sense understanding.
(U) The mere fact that the "intelligence process" conducted by the Intelligence
Community includes but is not limited to "analysis" and "dissemination" does not mean
that a policy organization is conducting "Intelligence Activities" if it independently
"analyses" intelligence information provided by the IC and then "disseminates" the
results of its analysis. To assert such a proposition is akin to asserting that "cows have
four legs and give milk, therefore, all four-legged animals that give milk are cows."
(U) The Draft Report cites the definition of "Intelligence Production" found in
DoD Directive No. 5 105.2 1 in an effort to characterize OUSD(P) activities as
"Intelligence Activities." But the actual definition does not support this argument.
(U) The term "Intelligence Production" as defined in Directive No. 5 105.2 1 does
not apply to any activities under review here. Paragraph E2.1.3 of the Directive provides:
"Intelligence Production. The validation, correlation, analysis, and interpretation
of information on foreign intelligence and counterintelligence topics, including the
use of automated data bases and the presentation and dissemination of .the results."
This definition, just as the related definitions discussed above, makes clear that
"Intelligence Production" is the full process of validation, correlation, analysis,
interpretation, presentation and dissemination. It is a distortion of the definition to assert
that a single activity, such as analysis or interpretation, constitutes "Intelligence
Production."
(U) In the present matter, the draft briefing and work done to prepare it were
nothing more than a critical review of intelligence information already produced by the
IC. The work presented a fresh assessment of how that information might be understood
if certain a priori assumptions about lack of cooperation between secularists and
fundamentalists were avoided. At the very least the work under review involved no
validation or correlation, as those tasks had already been done by the IC as part of its
"Intelligence Production." The attempt to stretch the definition of "Intelligence
Production" to include the critique of IC reports and products by a non-IC office simply
does not work.
E. OUSD(P) Did Not Produce or Disseminate "Intelligence Assessments" or
"Intelligence Analysis" (U)
(U) The Draft Report asserts (e.g., page 4) that the draft briefing on the
relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida and the July 25,2002 memo preliminary to the
briefing were "OUSD(P)" "alternative intelligence assessments," and that this work
"evolved into Intelligence Analysis" (page 12). The work reviewed was not "intelligence
assessments" or "Intelligence Analysis" under any reasonable understanding of those
terms.
(U) Neither the Draft Report, nor any of the authorities mentioned there or here,
defines the term "intelligence assessment." Nor do they define the term "Intelligence
Analysis" despite the Draft Report's use of capital letters. But extrapolating from the
intelligence-related definitions discussed above, it seems reasonable to suggest that
"intelligence assessments" and "Intelligence Analysis" are assessments and analysis by
intelligence agencies about the meaning and significance of information acquired by
them during the six-part "intelligence process" of "planning and direction, collection,
processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and
evaluation and feedback" (JP 1-02 at 270). It follows that "intelligence assessments" and
"Intelligence Analysis" are disseminated by intelligence agencies and are clearly
identified as the "assessment" or "analysis" of the issuing agency or intelligence
community. Thus, intelligence consumers will know that they have the "assessment" or
"analysis" of that agency or community on the matter at hand as opposed to someone
else's assessment or analysis.
(U) Nothing of this sort took place in preparing and presenting the draft briefing in
question. As Part IV (Facts) above explains in detail, the July 25,2002 memo was an
internal document done in preparation for a briefing that the Deputy Secretary had
directed his Special Assistant and two DIA detailees working in the Policy organization
to put together for the Secretary of Defense. The memo did not present any "intelligence
assessment" or "intelligence finding" or anything that could reasonably be characterized
in that way. The memo did argue that there was a case to support an "Intelligence
Finding" that Iraq had been complicit in supporting al-Qaida terrorist activities. But this
obviously was a suggestion that the Intelligence Community should make such an
"Intelligence Finding," since neither the memo's author nor OUSD(P), the Deputy
Secretary or the Secretary were capable of making an "Intelligence Finding."
(U) As Part IV above also explains, the draft briefing likewise contained no
"intelligence assessments," "Intelligence Analysis" or anything that could reasonably be
so described. Each version of the draft briefing was marked as "draft" or "draft working
papers." Each time the briefing was given, it was well known to all in attendance that the
briefers were not speaking for the Intelligence Community but, to the contrary, were
presenting an alternative or critical analysis of information provided by the Intelligence
Community. The analysis intentionally took a different approach from some of the IC
analysis, because of the Deputy Secretary's direction to avoid the a priori assumption
that secular Baathists and Islamic hndamentalists would never cooperate and to examine
how the intelligence information might be understood in the absence of that assumption.
It would be preposterous to suggest that the draft briefing was an effort to usurp the role
of the IC, or that anyone was misled into believing that the draft briefing purported to
express "intelligence assessments" or "Intelligence Analysis" on behalf of the IC or
anyone else.
(U) Moreover, whatever the July 25,2002 memo and the draft briefing may have
been, they most certainly were not "OUSD(P)" assessments or conclusions, as the Draft
Report repeatedly asserts. As Part IV (Facts) discusses in detail, these work products
were never described or presented as an approved OUSD(P) or OSD position, all versions
of the briefing were marked "draft" or "drafi working papers," the USDP introduced the
drafi briefing to the DCI stating that it was merely one way of looking at the underlying
intelligence and not necessarily the correct way, and the drafi briefing itself was done at
the Deputy Secretary's direction. The draft briefing and work leading to it were not
initiated by "OUSD(P)," notwithstanding that two of the three authors happened at the
time to be working in the Policy organization on detail from DIA.
(U) The Draft Report seems to argue that the two DIA detailees continued to
function as intelligence analysts even though detailed to OUSD(P) and therefore their
activities in OUSD(P) "constituted intelligence analysis and in at least several cases,
intelligence production, which was not one of USD(P)'s specified functions in DoD
Directive 5 1 1 1.1" (page 6). This contention cannot withstand scrutiny. If it were correct,
OSUD(P) could never obtain intelligence analysts on detail from DIA without
committing "inappropriate" "Intelligence Activities." How to characterize work done by
detailees depends on the substance of what they actually do while detailees, not on the
nature of their duties in their home agencies. As demonstrated above, the work in
question here did not fall within any of the definitions of "Intelligence Activities" and did
not constitute "intelligence analysis."
(U) The Draft Report also seeks to support its claim that OUSD(P) produced
"alternative intelligence assessments" by referring to "confirmation" in interviews that
the DIA detailees "conducted independent intelligence analysis resulting in analytic
conclusions and products" (page 6). According to the contemporaneous written record,
however, at least one of the DIA detailees said that "[alt no point did I prepare an
intelligence estimate or publish anything I had written" during her involvement in the
work under review. In any event, the terminology that individuals in informal interviews
may have used or acquiesced to, advertently or inadvertently, cannot alter the nature of
the work they actually did or did not do. In this case they did not produce or disseminate
"intelligence assessments" or "Intelligence Analysis" on behalf of OUSD(P) or anyone
else.
F. The Relevant Orders and Directives Describe Intelligence Roles and Activities,
They Do Not Proscribe Policy Activities (U)
(U) The Report refers to definitions from DoD guidance dealing with intelligence
agencies and intelligence activities. It endeavors to apply these definitions to policy
activities undertaken for policy purposes within OSD. In so doing, the Draft Report
transforms these definitions into restrictions on what policy offices may appropriately do.
(U) There is no authority to support the view that definitions describing the
activities of intelligence agencies also apply to policy offices, or constitute limitations or
prohibitions on the activities that policy offices may appropriately conduct. To
demonstrate the fallacy of that thinking, one need only return to the relevant definitions.
(U) As discussed above, DoD Directive No. 5240.1 (Section 3.1) defines
"Intelligence Activities" as:
"The collection, production, and d.issemination of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence by DoD intelligence components authorized under [Executive
Order 123331."
(U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," December 4,
198 1, Section 3.4(e), defines "intelligence activities" as "all activities that agencies
within the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to this Order."
Section 3.4(f) defines "Intelligence Community and agencies within the Intelligence
Community" as "the following agencies or organizations," among which, as noted above,
OSD and OUSD(P) do not appear.
(U) DoD Directive No. 5240.1, Section 3.4, similarly defines "DoD intelligence
components" as "[all1 DoD Components conducting intelligence activities, including" a
list of named DoD elements among which, again as noted above, OSD and OUSD(P) do
not appear. But Section 2.1 of DoD Directive No. 5240.1 does define "DoD
Components" to include the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Thus, as also noted
above, the Directive distinguishes "all DoD Components" from "DoD Components
conducting intelligence activities." In consequence, the Directive's Section 3.1 definition
of "Intelligence Activities" by its terms only encompasses "DoD intelligence
components," not "all DoD Components," as discussed above.
(U) The above definitions make two things clear about "Intelligence Activities":
1. They constitute a process that entails collection, production "and" (not
"or") dissemination of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, and
2. They are activities conducted by intelligence agencies, and not policy or
other assessments or critiques by non-intelligence offices, even if these
activities have similarities with "intelligence activities" performed by
intelligence "agencies" or "components."
(U) The Draft Report in effect expands the definition of "Intelligence Activities"
contained in Directive 5240.1, Section 3.1, by dropping the restrictive clause "by DoD
intelligence components authorized under [E. 0. 123 3 31 ." In other words, by asserting
that OUSD(P) (admittedly not a "DoD intelligence component") engaged in "Intelligence
Activities," the Draft Report obviously regards those activities as something that can be
done by an entity that is not an "intelligence component." The Draft Report thus appears
to define "Intelligence Activities" as "the collection, production, and dissemination of
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence" simply, regardless of by whom or what.
(U) This re-definition not only is incorrect on its face but in practice would lead to
absurd results, as reference to the definition of "foreign intelligence" demonstrates. The
term "foreign intelligence" appears in the definition of "Intelligence Activities," i.e., the
"collection, production, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
by DoD intelligence components authorized under" E.O. 12333. Both E.O. 12333
(Section 3.4(d)) and DoD Directive 5240.1 (Section 3.2) define "Foreign intelligence" as
"information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers,
organizations or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on
international terrorist activities."
(U) This definition of "foreign intelligence" is quite broad. The New York Times,
for example, routinely engages in the collection (gathering and reporting), production
(writing and editing) and dissemination (publication) of information relating to the
"capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons." In
the same vein, State Department Foreign Service officers, stationed both abroad and in
Washington, constantly, through their contacts with foreign officials and others, learn
about the "capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or
persons"; they report this information, which is used by the regional and other bureaus of
the State Department to produce memoranda containing assessments and policy
recommendations, which, in turn, are disseminated to officials throughout the
government. Thus, if one were to accept the Draft Report's modification of the definition
of "intelligence activities," one would have to conclude that the New York Times and
State Department Foreign Service officers routinely engage in "intelligence activities."
(U) Similarly, OUSD(P) routinely deals with "information relating to the
capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons." For
example:
(U) Policy personnel routinely meet with foreign counterparts, at both the leadership
and desk officer levels. These encounters occur at international meetings and
conferences, formal defense bi-lateral consultations, and formal or informal one-onone
meetings. During such meetings, policy personnel acquire "foreign intelligence"
information which is typically recorded in Memoranda for the Record, e-mails, etc.
(U) In addition, policy personnel seek out other sources of information about "the
capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons,"
for example, by attending academic or other conferences, or by talking to
knowledgeable academics or other non-government experts on relevant subjects.
(U) On the basis of this information and other sources (including "open source"
intelligence, diplomatic reporting, as well as intelligence reports), Policy personnel
prepare memoranda containing their analyses of foreign situations and associated
policy recommendations. Almost all the work of regional offices, and much of the
work of functional offices, deals with "the capabilities, intentions, and activities of
foreign powers, organizations, or persons."
(U) These memoranda are disseminated within OUSD(P), to the Joint Staff and other
DoD components, to the Defense Department leadership and to interagency
colleagues.
(U) If this and similar activity were to be considered "Intelligence Activities," then
attempting to follow the Draft Report's recommendation that "internal controls" be
established to ensure that "Intelligence Activities" are not performed within OUSD(P)
would be tantamount to shutting down OUSD(P) altogether.
(U) In fact, the guidance and authorities discussed here and in the Draft Report
impose no restrictions on activities involving analyses, evaluations, assessments, critical
reviews, or even alternative judgments by non-IC offices, not even if the subject of such
analyses, etc. is intelligence reporting or intelligence products furnished by the IC, nor
even if such analyses, etc. lead to judgments about intelligence information furnished by
the IC that differ from the IC's judgments about the same information.
(U) Where the relevant guidance intends to prohibit or regulate activities by non-
IC offices, it does so in clear terms, and in only two instances: the prohibition on
engaging or conspiring to engage in assassination (E.O. 12333, Section 2.1 1 ; DoD
Directive No. 5240.1, Section 4.4); and the prohibition on all DoD Components from
conducting or providing support for the conduct of special activities except as the
Directive otherwise provides (DoD Directive No. 5240.1 Section 4.3). Other than these
two cases, the relevant guidance does not proscribe any activities by non-IC offices. In
particular it lacks any limitation on analyses or assessments by Policy offices of
Intelligence Community information and products. There is no basis for characterizing
the admittedly lawful and authorized work under review as "inappropriate."
VI. OUSD(P) NONCONCURRENCE (U)
A. With the Findings of the Draft Report (U)
(U) For all the reasons stated in these comments, OUSD(P) does not concur in any
finding expressed in the Draft Report except the finding that the activities reviewed were
lawful and authorized, and specifically does not concur in incorrect assertions (e.g., at
pages 4 and 14):
(U) That OUSD(P) "developed, produced and then disseminated alternative
intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which were
inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decisionmakers";
(U) That the actions reviewed were allegedly "OUSD(P)" activities;
(U) That the actions reviewed were allegedly "inappropriate given that the products
did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community
and were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products";
(U) That there was an alleged "expanded role and mission of the OUSD(P) from
Defense Policy formulation to alternative intelligence analysis and dissemination";
(U) That anything inappropriate occurred because "OUSD(P) lacked the management
controls to ensure that Intelligence Activities were not performed, and that when
Policy disagreed with the Intelligence Community, products produced by Policy
clearly showed the variance with the Intelligence Community";
(U) That OUSD(P) had a responsibility to, but "did not provide 'the most accurate
analysis of intelligence' to senior decision-makers"; and
(U) That any OUSD(P) activities, in response to requests by the Deputy Secretary, the
Secretary of Defense or otherwise, constituted "Intelligence Activities."
B. With the Recommendations of the Draft Report (U)
(U) For all the reasons stated in these comments, OUSD(P) does not concur in any
recommendation expressed. in the Draft Report, and specifically does not concur in the
recommendations (page 14) that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
"a. Establish internal controls so that 'Intelligence Activities' are not performed
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy" - as OUSD(P) did
not perform any "Intelligence Activities" and no such "internal controls" are
needed.
"b. If in its policy formulation role, there is disagreement with the Intelligence
Community consensus:
"(1 .) Use existing procedures within the Intelligence Community to request
an Alternative Judgment" - as existing IC prqcedures for producing
"alternative judgments" do not apply to non-IC offices and are irrelevant to
critiques by policy offices of IC work.
"(2.) Clearly articulate in policy products the Intelligence Community
consensus and the basis for disagreement or variance from the Intelligence
Community consensus" - as such a requirement would inappropriately
constrain policy work by requiring policy offices to vet every policy
product with the IC in order to determine whether or not it disagreed or
varied with an IC "consensus" and - if it did -- to articulate the IC
"consensus" in the policy product.
(U) Accordingly, OUSD(P) has taken no actions, and plans none, in response to
the proposed recommendations.
VII. CONCLUSION (U)
(U) Bipartisan reports and studies by various commissions and congressional
committees since the 911 1 attacks have stressed the need for hard questions and
alternative thinking on the part of the Intelligence and Policy Communities alike. The
motivation behind such observations has been a broadly held consensus that the
Intelligence Community suffered major failures in its assessments of several key threats
and issues before both the 911 1 attacks and the recent Iraq war. As the WMD
Commission wrote, to quote just one such report:
"We conclude that good-faith efforts by intelligence consumers to understand the
bases for analytic judgments . . . are entirely legitimate. This is the case even if
policymakers raise questions because they do not like the conclusions or are
seeking evidence to support policy preferences. Those who must use intelligence
are entitled to insist that they be fully informed as to both the evidence and the
analysis."53
(U) The conclusions in the Draft Report reflect a disturbing departure from the
trend in all these reports and studies to encourage the type of alternative thinking that
motivated the work reviewed in this Project. By mischaracterizing that work as
inappropriate "intelligence assessments," the Draft Report fundamentally misinterprets
what the work actually was - namely, a critical assessment by OSD, for policy purposes,
of IC reporting and finished IC products on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. Such
conclusions, if sustained, would have a dampening effect on future initiatives challenging
intelligence assessments. The facts do not justify such conclusions.
(U) The work found "inappropriate" was an exercise in alternative thinking that
the second most senior civilian in this Department directed his subordinates to prepare
and brief to the most senior official of this Department. The latter, after receiving the
draft briefing, directed that it be shared with the DCI. When the Deputy National
Security Advisor requested the briefing, the Deputy Secretary's office directed that it be
given to him. These are the activities that the Draft Report characterizes as
"inappropriate," because it considers them to be "production" and "dissemination" of an
"alternative intelligence assessment" contradicting assessments of the "charteredintelligence
community." If the OIG actually believes that it was inappropriate for the
Deputy Secretary of Defense to have some non-IC OSD staff members do a critical
assessment of some IC work on a subject of major significance for national security,
inappropriate for the Secretary of Defense to share the OSD work with the DCI, and
inappropriate for the Deputy Secretary to share the work with the Deputy National
Security Advisor when requested by the latter, the OIG should say so directly instead of
53 (U) Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons ofMass
Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (3 1 March 2005), p. 189.
finding fault with subordinate OSD offices and staff members who did as they were
instructed to do.
(U) The proposed recommendations would put a straightjacket on not only the
type of work reviewed here but also the large majority of work routinely done in OSD,
particularly in OUSD(P).
(U) By having OUSD(P) to articulate the Intelligence Community consensus in
any policy products that may vary from an IC "consensus" and the basis for such
variance, the proposed recommendations would inappropriately constrain policy
work. They would require policy offices to vet every policy recommendation or
analysis with the IC in order to determine whether or not it disagreed or varied
with an IC "consensus." The proposed recommendations would also burden
policy offices with a requirement to articulate the IC "consensus" when the IC
itself should do so.
(U) By having OUSD(P) to seek an "Alternative Judgment" from the IC whenever
any OUSD(P) product disagreed with IC views, the proposed recommendations
would seriously constrain and deter OUSD(P) personnel from articulating
alternative views about the same information on which the IC's assessments were
based.
(U) By mischaracterizing alternative reviews of IC work as "Intelligence
Activities," the conclusions of the Draft Report would chill the vigorous debate
and hard questioning that most observers have recognized as necessary to avoid
the types of intelligence failures experienced in the recent past.
(U) We strongly urge a reconsideration and major revision of the Draft Report and
the conclusions expressed therein.
Eric S. Edelman
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy