Colonel Austin Bay and I were planning a very civil blog feud on the nature of the British naval surrender that led to the appalling spectacle in Iran. Unfortunately, there’s not enough distance between us to have any real virtual hair-pulling. Still, what differences do exist between us are worth exploring.

We both think the soldiers acquitted themselves disgracefully after their abduction. Austin aptly calls the events in Tehran a “moral disgrace.” Our only dispute centers on the soldiers’ conduct during their actual abduction. I wrote (in so many words) that their subsequent declaration that “fighting back was not an option” was ludicrous. My suggestion was that they should have fought back, and that going meekly into Iranian custody paved the way for the ensuing national disgrace.

Austin, who knows a lot more about such thing than I do, disagreed, writing:

“Tactical surprise reinforced by heavy machineguns at close range (and lack of immediate backup) make surrender an understandable and probably appropriate decision. The situation strikes me as one of instant, futile slaughter. Better planning, better coordination with the supporting forces, and tighter tactical security may well have alerted and saved the sailors and marines. However, would, should, and could are the words of hindsight when staring down the bore of a heavy machinegun.”

I’m hardly in a position to take issue with Austin’s tactical assessment. The one bone I would pick here is whether the Iranians would have had the nerve to actually slaughter the British troops. I think there’s ample room for doubt on that score.

On Easter Sunday, Frank J. of IMAO.us posted a letter from one of America’s own guests of the Ayatollah from 1979 -1981. Frank’s correspondent is a Marine, and his whole letter is must reading. I found the following bit particularly relevant to mine and Austin’s conversation:

On the day of the takeover, the Marines were outnumbered at least 1000 to 1. We held the consulate and the communications vault for over 12 hours, helping to destroy equipment and classified material. We were under STRICT orders not to fire our weapons or pop gas grenades (too late for that last one..hee, hee, hee). We were eventually told that we were on or own and to make a break for it. The monkeys even put one of the diplomats in front of the comm vault peep eye with a pistol to their head and threatened to kill them unless the door was opened. It wasn't and they didn't. Once all the material was destroyed the doors were opened and they all got the crap beat out of them.

The reason I highlighted the part that I did is the enemy’s bluster often doesn’t conform with his actual intent. But there’s an even larger point here – if the British soldiers were going to avoid disgracing their nation, they had to begin “fighting back” at some point. Doing so would have jeopardized their lives. Whether they failed or succeeded, “fighting back” was the only way to honor their service and their country. Fighting back also would have struck a powerful blow for freedom, showing the true strength of free men and women.

But they didn’t fight back. As Medal of Honor winner Jack Jacobs observed on MSNBC, this troop’s sole apparent interest was self-preservation. I don’t think it’s unduly harsh to say that for this particular group of soldiers, “Fighting back is not an option” could serve as their platoon’s motto. If, as many of us suspect, this entire affair was an Iranian attempt to measure Western mettle, then “catastrophe” is too mild a word for what occurred.

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